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BASIC LAW, BASIC POLITICS:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GAME OF HONG KONG
U
Benny Y.T. Tai*
Most lawyers have a doctrinal understanding of the constitution. They are sceptical
of any political understanding of a constitution, feeling that this may taint the
sacredness of the legal paradigm. Political scientists view things differently. They
offer three approaches to understanding a constitution from the perspective of the
political paradigm: the attitudinal approach, the institutional approach and the strategic
approach. The author argues that the incorporation of the political paradigm into
one's analytical framework is unavoidable if one wants to have a comprehensive
understanding of the constitution. The author integrates the legal and political
paradigms into the form of a constitutional game, and applies this analytical framework
to the Basic Law, thereby illustrating how law and politics have interacted in the
constitutional development of Hong Kong over the last 10 years.
Introduction
As Chief Justice Li of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) said, the Basic Law of the HKSAR
is a constitution.' Therefore, the Basic Law shares the characteristics' and
functions of most other constitutions.' To understand the real meaning
and significance of the Basic Law, one would then also have to apply similar
methods and approaches to those used when interpreting a constitution.4
* Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong, LLB, PCLL (HKU), LLM (London).
Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration [19991 1 HKLRD 315, at 337: "The Basic Law is a national law
and is the constitution of the Region."
2 Ng Ka Ling, at p 339: "It is generally accepted that in the interpretation of a constitution such as the
Basic Law a purposive approach is to be applied. The adoption of a purposive approach is necessary
because a constitution states general principles and expresses purposes without condescending to
particularity and definition of terms. Gaps and ambiguities are bound to arise and, in resolving them,
the courts are bound to give effect to the principles and purposes declared in, and to be ascertained
from, the constitution and relevant extrinsic materials. So, in ascertaining the true meaning of the
instrument, the courts must consider the purpose of the instrument and its relevant provisions as well
as the language of its text in the light of the context, context being of particular importance in the
interpretation of a constitutional instrument."
3 Ng Ka Ling, at p 337: "Like other constitutions, it distributes and delimits powers, as well as provid-
ing for fundamental rights and freedoms. As with other constitutions, laws which are inconsistent
with the Basic Law are of no effect and are invalid."
4 One may argue that the Basic Law is more than a constitution even if one treats it as a legal code. As
Chan CJHC said, "The Basic Law is not only a brainchild of an international treaty, the Joint Declar-
ation. It is also a national law of the PRC and the constitution of the HKSAR. It translates the basic
policies enshrined in the Joint Declaration into more practical terms." (HKSAR v Ma Wai-kwan
[1997] HKLRD 761 at 772.)
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There are many decisions a society makes that involve its constitution.
There are decisions to make, implement, interpret, adjudicate, amend and
change a constitution. To have a comprehensive understanding of a constitu-
tion, one needs to know how all these decisions relating to a constitution are
made.
Most lawyers treat a constitution as a legal code and apply the same
doctrinal analysis to the interpretation of a constitution as they would any
other legal codes. Doctrinal analysis "aims to understand the law from no
more than a thorough examination of a finite and relatively fixed universe of
authoritative texts consisting of cases, statutes, and other primary sources,
the relative importance of which depends on the legal tradition and system
within which the legal researcher operates."'
Such a doctrinal mindset causes lawyers to view constitutional interpreta-
tion as mainly a process of assigning meaning. Their primary concern is to
discern the meaning embedded in the constitutional text. A practical reason
for the need to have a definite meaning for the text is that this is necessary to
resolve constitutional disputes that may break out in a courtroom, a legisla-
tive chamber or even in the public square.
Legal scholarship is also predominately normative.6 The main interest of
legal scholars is to make prescriptions to legal decision makers on how they
should give meaning to the constitutional text and decide cases accordingly.
This may be called the doctrinal paradigm or legal paradigm' of constitu-
tion. In this article, a paradigm of constitution is the perspective through
which constitutionalists with their presuppositions and disciplinary orienta-
tion understand the nature, functions, purposes and meaning of a constitution.
Applying the doctrinal paradigm, legal scholars and judges develop differ-
ent legal principles or approaches to assist them in ascertaining the "right"
meaning of the text of a constitution' and debate with each other on what
should be the proper method of interpretation.
5 Douglas W. Vick, "Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law," (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society
163, at 178.
6 Edward L. Rubin, "Law and the Methodology of Law," (1997) Wis. L. Rev. 521, 522 and Barry Fried-
man, "The Politics of Judicial Review," (2005) 84 Texas Law Review 257.
7 The word "paradigm" has been widely used in academia since Thomas Kuhn published his book, The
Structure of Science Revolutions in 1962. Kuhn defined a paradigm as "an entire constellation of
beliefs, values and techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given community." See Thomas
Kuhn, The Structure of Science Revolutions (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
3rd edn, 1996), p 175. In legal study, the concept of paradigm has also been used. See Jtirgen Habermas,
"Paradigms of Law," (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 771 in which Habermas has used the term "para-
digm" to refer to the social ideal or social vision that guides the making and application of law.
8 This article does not provide a very elaborate description of the different approaches as it is assumed
that the readers are mainly lawyers and they are familiar with these approaches of the legal paradigm.
For a detailed description of the different approaches, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation
(Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1991); Richard H. Fallon Jr., "A Constructive Coher-
ence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation," (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 1189; and Robert
Post, "Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, (1990) 30 Representation pp 13-41.
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 504 2007
The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong 505
Bobbitt provides a summary of the six principles or approaches that are
used by legal scholars and judges to discover the meaning of a constitutional
provision. They are:
". . . the historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of
the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the
Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average contem-
porary 'man on the street'); structural (inferring rules from the relationships
that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up); doctrinal
(applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from those
moral commitments of the ... ethos that are reflected in the Constitu-
tion); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a
particular rule)."'
Though the approaches are different and may even conflict with each other,
they share the same assumption that upon identifying the right method of
interpretation, one can make the right interpretive decision.Yo
However, the sufficiency of the legal paradigm to understand decision
making concerning constitution has been questioned by many." Dahl com-
ments that:
"... competent students of constitutional law, including learned justices
of the Supreme Court themselves, disagree ... where the words of the
Constitution are general, vague, ambiguous, or not clearly applicable; where
precedents may be found on both sides; and where experts differ in pre-
dicting the consequences of the various alternatives or the degree of
probability that the possible consequences will actually ensue."12
Besides lawyers, political scientists belong to another group which also has
an interest in examining constitutions. As Sweet said, "All law is politics,
but not all politics is law."" Among all forms of law, constitution must be
9 Bobbitt, n 8, pp 13 -14. Bobbitt preferred to use the term, modality, which is defined as "the way in
which [one] characterize a form of expression as true."
10 Ronald Dworkin put forward his controversial "one right answer thesis" in "No Right Answer," in
P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds), Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford:
Clarendon Press: 1977) but the thesis is much disputed. See A.D. Woozley, "No Right Answer,"
(1979) 29 Philosophical Quarterly 25 and Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), Ch 4.
n Segal and Spaeth provided a comprehensive critique on the legal paradigm. See Jeffrey A. Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press,
2002), Ch 2.
12 Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,"
(1957) 6 Journal of Public Law 279 at 281.
13 Alec Stone Sweet, "The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe," (2007) 5 Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 69, at 72.
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the one with the strongest political flavour. The status and coverage of a
constitution make any decision concerning its making, interpretation, imple-
mentation, adjudication and amendment or change highly political because
it deeply and widely involves and affects political and social interests and
groups."4
Since the establishment of the HKSAR in 1997, Hong Kong has been
embroiled in many political controversies." The HKSAR Government, the
Courts of the HKSAR, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress (NPCSC) and all other political actors in Hong Kong without ex-
ception have stated their political stances in these controversies in legal and
constitutional terms.16 The limitation of the legal paradigm of constitution
can be clearly demonstrated as it can provide no rational or objective method
or principle that can settle these political or constitutional controversies. They
have been settled or suppressed more by non-legal means and considerations
or at least the legal paradigm has only provided partial answers.
Unlike lawyers, political scientists' focus is not so much "what does the
constitution mean?" but "why is the constitution understood by the political
actors (including the court) in a particular way?"" Different methods have
been applied by political scientists to answer this question. Their approaches
may be called the political paradigm of constitution.1
14 The three central issues in politics are "the selection of society preferences, the enforcement of the
choices that reveal them and the production of goals or outputs that embody the choices." Different
decisions concerning a constitution all involve these three central political issues. See William H.
Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p 2. William Riker is the pioneer of the positive political theory
which is one of the major approaches (the strategic approach) used to study constitutions from a
political perspective. See discussion below.
15 The best examples of these political controversies include the right of abode controversies, the Art
23 controversies, the democratic development controversies and the controversy concerning the
length of the term of office of a re-elected chief executive.
16 See Johannes Chan, Fu Hualing and Yash Ghai (eds) Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate: Conflict over
Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000) and Benny Y.T. Tai, "Ng Siu Tung
and Others v Director of Immigration" (2002) 1 The International Journal of Constitutional Law
147-151 for the right of abode controversies; see Fu Hualing, Carole J. Peterson and Simon N.M.
Young (eds) National Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong's Article 23 under Scrutiny
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005) for the Article 23 controversies; see Johannes
Chan and Lison Harris (eds), Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate, 2005 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Law
Journal Limited, 2005) and Albert H.Y. Chen "The Constitutional Controversy in Hong Kong Spring
2004," 34 (2004) HKLJ 215 for the democratic development controversies; and see Benny Y.T. Tai,
"A Tale of the Unexpected: Tung's Resignation and the Ensuing Constitutional Controversy" (2005)
35 HKLJ 7-16 for the controversy concerning the length of the term of office of a re-elected chief
executive.
17 Friedman, n 6, p 258.
18 There may be a very fine distinction between pure politics and constitutional politics and the
differences will be explained in Section 3 of this article. Therefore, in approaching constitution from
a political paradigm, not all approaches in the study of political science will be used. For those
approaches that are borrowed, questions concerning the making, interpretation, implementation,
adjudication and amendment of a constitution might not be expressed in their original form. For the
different approaches of political science, see David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in
Political Science (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), Chs 1-6.
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The thesis of this article is that for one to have a comprehensive under-
standing of decisions concerning constitution including its making,
interpretation, implementation, adjudication and amendment or change, both
the legal and political paradigms of constitution have to be studied.
There are five sections to this article. Section 1 introduces the approaches
of the political paradigm and explores the contribution of these approaches
in enriching lawyers' understanding of a constitution. Section 2 explains why
the two paradigms are not necessarily conflicting and could be comple-
mentary to each other. Section 3 puts forward an analytical framework - a
constitutional game to integrate the legal and the political paradigms aiming
to assist one in arriving at a comprehensive understanding of constitution.
Section 4 applies this "constitutional game" analytical framework to the Basic
Law and illustrates how law and politics have interacted in the constitutional
development of Hong Kong in the last ten years. Section 5 makes some con-
clusive observations on the application of the "constitutional game" analytical
framework to Hong Kong.
1. The Approaches of the Political Paradigm of Constitution
Like the legal paradigm, there is more than one approach from the political
paradigm. At least three can be identified."9 They are the attitudinal approach,
the institutional approach and the strategic approach. 0 Political scientists
also disagree among each other on what should be the proper approach of the
political paradigm. This article will argue that the debates among political
scientists, among lawyers, and between political scientists and lawyers on which
approach or paradigm should be preferred are unnecessary. All the approaches
and paradigms can be integrated to give a comprehensive understanding of a
constitution's complexity.21
19 Nancy Maveety, "The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science," in Nancy
Maveety (ed) The Pioneers ofJudicial Behavior (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003),
p 5 .
20 These approaches are developed by political scientists in their study of judicial behaviour. Among all
political actors in a constitutional system, judges are more likely to adopt a legal paradigm in under-
standing a constitution. If judges are also found to have been applying a political paradigm of
constitution, the other political actors must also be using a political paradigm to understand a con-
stitution though the political factors influencing their understanding would be very different from
those of judges.
21 See Sections 2 and 3.
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(a) The Attitudinal Approach22
According to the attitudinal approach, political actors give meaning to
the constitution in light of their ideological attitudes and valueS23 and make
decisions concerning the constitution accordingly so as to have those values
realised in the constitutional system.
There may not be too much difficulty in applying the attitudinal approach
to political actors who are free to rely on their ideological attitudes and
values to make political decisions like the members of the legislature or the
chief executive. However, the explanatory power of the attitudinal approach
may be more limited if it is applied to judges. Most people believe that judges
make constitutional decisions only on the basis of its legal nature. That is the
reason why most of the works on the attitudinal approach pertain to an analysis
of judicial decision making.
Segal and Spaeth are the most prominent promoters of the attitudinal
approach. 24 As they explained in their most important publication, The
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, the attitudinal approach
"represents a melding together of key concepts from legal realism, political
science, psychology, and economics."26
Like the legal realists, the attitudinal approach deconstructs the legal
paradigm by asserting that the legal text cannot be the actual basis of mean-
ing given to constitutional provisions. Behaviouralism from political science,
in turn, provides the research methodologies and orientation." It also
22 If it is considered from a wider perspective of political science rather than just within the context of
constitutional politics, this approach can be referred to as the behavioural approach.
23 Segal and Spaeth, n 11 above, p 86.
24 Earlier works on the attitudinal approach include Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study
I in Judicial Votes and Values 1937-1947 (New York: Macmillan, 1948) and Glendon Schubert, The
Judicial Mind Revisited: Psychometric Analysis of Supreme Court Ideology (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1974). The significant difference between the more recent work of the attitudinal approach
and the earlier works is that later works have based their analysis more from the rational choice
analysis borrowed from economics. See the discussion below.
25 See n 9 above.
26 Segal and Spaeth, n 11 above, p 86.
27 There are eight main claims for behaviouralism: (1) There are discoverable regularities in politics
which can lead to theories with predictive value. (2) Such theories must be testable in principle. (3)
Political science should be concerned with observable behaviour which can be rigorously recorded.
(4) Findings should be based on quantifiable data. (5) Research should be made systematic by being
theory oriented and directed. (6) Political science should become more self-conscious and critical
about its methodology. (7) Political science should aim at applied research that can provide solutions
to immediate social problems. The truth or falsity of values is not its proper concern as it cannot be
amenable to empirical investigation. (8) Political science should become more interdisciplinary and
draw on the other social sciences. See Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-
Henry, Research Methods in Politics (Basingstoke, England and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004),
p 15.
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supplies the explanation that political actors are all "motivated by their own
preferences.""
The attitudinal approach obtains its definition of attitude from psychol-
ogy. An attitude is "an interrelated set of beliefs about an object or situation."29
In the discussion of constitutional politics, the object of the beliefs may be
the nature, purpose and function of a constitution. The situation of the be-
liefs may be the historical, ideological, economic, political, social and cultural
backgrounds and contexts from which a constitutional question arises and
has to be answered.
The influence of economics can be seen from the emphasis of the attitudi-
nal approach in which political actors choose a decision concerning
constitution by applying an economic notion of rationality. 1 They select an
understanding of the constitution among various alternatives available within
the framework of the formal and informal rules and norms that can best achieve
their policy goal after considering whether the likelihood of this understand-
ing will at the end be realised.3 2
There are several major criticisms about the attitudinal approach. First, it
fails to give sufficient account for factors which "complicate the relationship
between a political actor's choice and the effectuation of his/her desired out-
come."33 Second, by dismissing the relevance of the legal nature of the
constitutional text completely, the attitudinal approach gives no weight to
the belief that a constitution would have "a constraining or a motivating
force in the mind of political actors."
28 Pritchett, n 21, pp xii, xiii cited in Segal and Spaeth, n 11, p 87.
29 Harold J. Spaeth, An Introduction to Supreme Court Decision Making (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972),
p 65 .
30 A different understanding of object and situation is provided in Segal and Spaeth, n 11, p 91. Further
elaboration of their understanding can be found in Harold J. Spaeth, "The Attitudinal Model," in
Lee Epstein, Contemplating Courts (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), p 307.
31 Like the strategic approach, the attitudinal approach also incorporates rational choice analysis into
its analytical framework. Attitudinalists do not believe that the institutional and strategic contexts
could impose too much constraint on political actors in making constitutional decisions. However,
they agree that the pure form of the approach, ie political actors can decide according to their un-
constrained preferences, is only applicable to Supreme Court judges when deciding constitutional
cases. In those cases, they are insulated from institutional and strategic constraints because the judges
have lifetime tenure, no ambition for higher office and control over the court's agenda. For other
situations faced by Supreme Court judges and other political actors, the attitudinalists' stance may
not be too different from the strategic approach. See Jeffrey A. Segal, "Supreme Court Deference to
Congress: An Examination of the Markist Model," in Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman,
Supreme Court Decision-Making (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999),
pp 237-239.
32 Segal and Spaeth, n 11, pp 92-97. See further David W. Rhode and Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court
Decision Making (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).
3 Jack Knight, "Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model," (1994) 4 Law and Courts
Spring Issue, pp 5-6.
3 Rogers M. Smith, "Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model," (1994) 4 Law and
Courts Spring Issue, pp 8-9.
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Third, attitudinalists place too much emphasis on the individual prefer-
ence of political actors and overlook "how preferences are constituted by
broader, institutionalised patterns of meaning.""s Fourth, by concentrating
on the instrumental value of a constitution to achieve what the political
actors desired, there is not much description and analysis on the substantive
values believed to be embedded in the constitution by the political actors. In
other words, prescriptive and normative jurisprudence are excluded.36 Fifth,
the attitudinal approach continues to see the decision of political actors con-
cerning constitution as "shaped by forces outside their strategic context".3
Nonetheless, the attitudinal approach opens a new perspective for one
to not just see constitution from "a sterile brand of doctrinal analysis" but
be able to develop a constitutional understanding with "deeper and more
systemic attempts to predict and explain how and why political actors operat-
ing under a unique set of institutional constraints decide as they do.""
(b) The Institutional Approach
As stated above, one of the limitations of the attitudinal approach is that it
fails to explain from where the ideological values of individual political actors
originate. The institutional approach asserts that the values and attitudes of
political actors are shaped by the institution in which the political actors live
and act.
Depending on the conception of institution, the institutional approach is
further divided into the old and new institutional approaches.39 The old insti-
tutional approach sees the institution as the formal structures and concrete
organisations of the state system40 while the new institutional approach"1
3 Cornell W. Clayton, "The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms,"
in Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, Supreme Court Decision-Making (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp 28-29. This is the major criticism from the institutional
approach. See discussion below.
36 Rubin, n 6 above. Rubin believes that legal scholarship is characterised by its prescriptive and nor-
mative quality. Removing such discussion from constitutional study, the attitudinal approach would
have no interest for lawyers.
37 This is the major criticism from the strategic approach. See Forrest Maltzman, James E Spriggs 1I, and
Paul J. Wahbeck, "Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court
Decision-Making," in Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, Supreme Court Decision-Making
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp 47-48. See discussion below.
38 Susan Lawrence, "Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model," (1994) 4 Law and
Courts Spring Issue, p 3.
39 Clayton, n 31 above, p 32.
40 It is actually the most traditional approach in political science and has an intellectual history even
earlier than the behaviouralism behind the attitudinal approach which only prospered in the 1950s
and 1960s.
41 Some authors include the strategic approach within new institutionalism and refer to this new insti-
tutional approach as the historical institutional approach. See Clayton, n 31 above, p 31 and Howard
Gilman, "More or Less than Strategy: Some Advantages to Interpretative Institutionalism in the
Analysis of Judicial Politics," (1996) 7 Law and Courts Winter Issue, p 6.
(2007) HKLJ
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accepts a "more dynamic and porous conception"4 2 emphasising the informal
norms, myths, habits of thought or background structures and patterns of
meaning.43
Smith provides a very good summary of the institutional approaches:
"In these approaches of the study of politics, institutions are expected
to shape interests, resources, and ultimately the conduct of political actors,
such as judges, governmental officials generally, party or interest-group
leaders, and other identifiable persons. The actions of such persons are
in turn expected to reshape those institutions more or less extensively.
Ideally, then, a full account of an important political event would con-
sider both the ways the context of 'background' institutions influenced
the political actions in question, and the ways in which those actions
altered relevant contextual structures or institutions."44
The new institutional approach adds to the old institutional approach by
"showing how the more formal and tangible institutions that old institution-
alists saw as causes or motivations for political actions are themselves
understood by new institutionalists as created within a received framework of
culture and the socially constructed mind."15
Unlike the attitudinal approach 46 which mainly uses individual persons
(members of political institutions) as the basic unit of analysis, the new insti-
tutional approach considers how institutions "influence the self-conception
of those who occupy roles defined by them in ways that can give those per-
sons distinctively 'institutional' perspectives."4 Hence, institutions can be "a
unit of analysis in their own right"*4 and can adopt their own value preferences
42 Ibid. But see Susan R. Burgress, "Beyond Instrumental Politics: The New Institutionalism, Legal
Rhetoric, and Judicial Supremacy," (1993) Polity Volume XXV, p 446 , at p 45 0 . Burgess believed that
the distinction between the old and new institutionalism is more than that: "At its most fundamen-
tal level, the new institutionalism posits an understanding of man that moves beyond narrow
self-interest, a conception of politics broader than mere decisional outcomes or aggregated prefer-
ences, and a conception of law and legal rhetoric that encompasses more than manipulation or
mystification." See also James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organiza-
tional Factors in Political Life," (1984) 78 The American Political Science Review 734, at 738.
43 Roger M. Smith, "Political Jurisprudence, the New 'Institutionalism,' and the Future of Public Law,"
(1988) 82 American Political Science Review 89, at 91. See the definition adopted by Smith which
included "not only fairly concrete organizations, such as governmental agencies, but also cognitive
structures, such as the patterns of rhetorical legitimation characteristic of certain traditions of polit-
ical discourse or the sorts of associated values found in popular 'belief systems."'
44 Ibid.
45 Clayton, n 31 above, p 33.
46 The strategic approach also places more emphasis on the individual political actor.
47 Smith, n 43 above, p 95. See also March and Olsen, n 42 above, p 739.
4 Smith, n 43 above, p. 95. See also March and Olsen, n 42 above, p 739: "Without denying the
importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors, the new institu-
tionalism insists on a more autonomous role for political institutions. The state is not only affected by
society but also affects it. Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions
but also on the design of political institutions.... they are also collections of standard operation pro-
cedures and structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own rights."
Vol 37 Part 2
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as more than just an aggregate of the preferences of their members. A polit-
ical institution as a political actor is taken to be acting to a certain extent
coherently"9 and autonomously."
As members of institutions, individual political actors do not make deci-
sions necessarily out of their personal preferences. They may make decisions
to fulfil their duties and obligations which are defined by the institutions
to which they belong. These duties and obligations are transmitted to them
by socialisation through their participation in the internal processes of the
institution.5 1
Political actors also do not necessarily make decisions rationally, in an
instrumental sense, to select the best possible outcome that can realise their
values. Decisions may be made just to create a certain symbolic effect which
gives a perception of legitimacy for such an institution5 ' as expected or de-
manded by other political actors or institutions.
Applying the institutional approaches, especially the new version, to con-
stitutional politics, decisions of political actors concerning constitution are
influenced by the formal institution to which they belong and vice versa.
This institution in turn is also influenced by the wider social institutions and
vice versa.
This approach is also subject to several criticisms. First, the institutional
approach's understanding on the general question of preference formation is
too narrow. There is no reason that preferences of political actors could only
be shaped by their institutions but could not be motivated by various other
factors at the same time. 4 Second, the institutional approach does not pro-
vide much explanation on how institutions actually affect the behaviours of
political actors.
Third, if individual political actors are so inseparable from their specific
institutional contexts, the institutional approach would not be able to ac-
commodate at least a certain degree of creative individual choices relatively
autonomous from the institutional contexts and social background structures
that individuals are embedded within. Without such reflective autonomy of
49 March and Olsen, n 42 above, pp 738-739. Coherence of a political institution means that it makes
choices on the basis of some collective interest or intention, alternatives, and expectations. Political
institutions may have varying degree of coherence but institutionalists believe that the collective
interest is substantial enough to view an institution as acting as a coherent collective.
50 March and Olsen, n 42 above, pp 739. The claim of autonomy means that processes internal to
political institutions, although possibly triggered by external forces, affect how they make decisions.
51 March and Olsen, n 42 above, pp 739-741.
52 This is the major difference between the institutional approach and the strategic approach.
53 March and Olsen, n 42 above, pp 741-742.
54 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, "The New Institutionalism, Part II," (1997) 78 Law and Courts Spring
Issue, p 4, at p 7.
5 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,"
(1996) XLIV Political Studies 936, at 950.
(2007) HKLJ
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their members, there cannot be any change or improvement to the institu-
tions generated from the inside. 6
Fourth, it is said that political process is so much shaped by contingent
events and subjective perceptions that it is highly unlikely that institutions
could mould decisions of political actors in a very systematic manner."
Nonetheless, the institutional approach does add another dimension to
the study of constitutional politics. Individual political actors might not be as
unconstrained as the attitudinalists perceive. The source of such constraints
could be external as well as internal. Decisions concerning constitution might
not only be instrumental, but could also be symbolic.
(c) The Strategic Approach"
The strategic approach has several basic premises. First, political actors make
constitutional decisions to achieve certain political goals. This is similar to
the attitudinal approach. Second, unlike the attitudinalists, the strategic
approach does not see political actors as unsophisticated actors who make
decisions merely on the basis of their ideological attitudes.59 According to the
strategic approach, political actors realise that their ability to achieve their
goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other political actors
and actions they expect them to take.60 In other words, their decisions are
dependent on the decisions of other political actors.
Third, the choices available to political actors are structured by institu-
tions. This is similar to the institutional approach but the strategic approach
has a stronger emphasis on the external constraints rather than the internal
constraints from institutions.61
Maltzman, Spriggs II and Wahlbeck give a very good description of how
strategic considerations work in institutions:
56 Clayton, n 31 above, p 34.
57 Ellen M. Immergut, "Historical-Institutionalism in Political Science and the Problem of Change," in
Andreas Wimmer and Reinhart Kassler, Understanding Change: Models, Methodologies, and Metaphors
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p 254.
5 The earliest work on the strategic approach may be Walter Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). For the development of the strategic approach, see Lee
Epstein and Jack Knight, "Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look
Ahead," (2000) 53 Political Research Quarterly pp 625 -661.
5 Some attitudinalists do accept that political actors may take into consideration the preferences of
other actors but just believe that they are not substantial enough to cause the political actors to
compromise their ideological values. See Clayton, n 31 above.
60 Epstein and Knight, n 54 above, p 4. This is drawn from the rational choice theory. For rational
choice theory in general, see Jon Elster, Rational Choice (New York: University Press, 1986).
61 The strategic approach includes intra-institutional (ie between different political actors or organs of
the same institution like the interaction between different judges in the same court and between the
supreme court and the court of appeal) and inter-institutional constraints as the external constraints
while the institutional approach sees the constraints as originating internally from the institution as
an entity in itself.
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"To act strategically ... [political actors] must understand the consequences
of their own actions and be able to anticipate the responses of others.
Institutions facilitate this process and thus mediate between preferences
and outcomes by affecting the [political actors] beliefs about the conse-
quences of their actions. Institutions therefore influence strategic decision
makers through two principal mechanisms - by providing information
about expected behavior and by signaling sanctions for noncompliance."6 2
On the basis of these premises, many followers of the strategic approach have
applied a game-analytical framework to analyse the inter-relationships of
political actors in different constitutional settings." This game analytical
framework will be further elaborated in Section 3.
The strategic approach also has its criticisms. First, this approach presumes
that there is at least a certain degree of institutional separation of powers
within the constitutional system before political actors can act strategically.6 4
The explanatory power of the strategic approach is more limited for authori-
tarian regimes.
Second, like all analysis relying on rational choice thinking, the strategic
approach has another questionable assumption that all political actors must
act rationally and only engage in instrumental politics.15
Third, it seems that the goals of political actors under the strategic approach
must be short term and self-centred.66 This may be too narrow a view of what
actually motivates political actors.
Fourth, the strategic approach presents all interactions between political
actors as if they are all in the form of competition, ie each competing to have
one's goal be realised. This dismisses the possibility of consensus reached by
the political actors through genuine dialogue or deliberation.67
62 Maltzman, Spriggs II and Wahlbeck, n 37 above, p 47.
63 See William N. Jr. Eskridge, "Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil rights
Game," (1991) 79 California Law Review 613 (United States); Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, "On the
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy," (1996) 30 Law and Society Review 87 (United States); Georg
Vanberg, "Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review,"
(2001) 45 Americanjournalof Political Science pp 346-361 (Germany); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and
Olga Shevetsova, "The Role of Constitutional Courts in Establishment and Maintenance of Demo-
cratic Systems of Government," (2001) 35 Law and Society Review pp 117-163 (Russia); Tom Ginsburg,
Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), Ch 3 (Asian Countries). For other methods of the strategic approach, see
Epstein and Knight, n 53, pp 641-651.
64 Most studies in this field examine constitutional courts vested with a certain degree of power over
constitutional review.
65 Howard Gillman, "More or Less Than Strategy: Some Advantages to Interpretive Institutionalism in
the Analysis of Judicial Politics," (1996) 78 Law and Courts Winter Issue, p 6, at p 9.
66 Howard Gillman, "Placing Judicial Motives in Context: A Response to Lee Epstein and Jack Knight,"
(1997) 78 Law and Courts Spring Issue, p 10, at p 11.
67 Ibid.
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Nonetheless, another important dimension in understanding political
actors in their decisions concerning constitutions is provided by the strategic
approach. Constitutional politics is a dynamic process involving the inter-
dependent decisions of all political actors who perceive, predict and prepare
for the decisions of others before making their own.
2. Paradigm vs Paradigm? Approach vs Approach?
There is disagreement among legal scholars on what is the right legal approach
to adopt. Political scientists also dispute with each other on what should be
the right political approach. In addition, there is dissent between legal schol-
ars and political scientists on whether one should use a legal or a political
approach to understand constitution; sometimes, fierce debate ensues. At other
times, the opposing parties are simply ignored. Both situations may not be
healthy for reaching an in-depth understanding of our legal reality.
(a) Epistemological Presuppositions
These disagreements are caused by an epistemological presupposition that
there can only be a single path to arrive at a unique understanding of reality.
According to this presupposition, the different approaches and paradigms must
then be incommensurable. If a certain constitutional understanding arrived
at by a particular approach or paradigm of constitution is right, then all other
approaches and paradigms cannot be right at the same time.68 However, must
we see the approaches and paradigms of constitution as incommensurable?
Must we approach the study of constitution with such a presupposition?
This article will put forward some alternative epistemological presupposi-
tions drawn from two general factual propositions that most people will accept
intuitively or find it difficult to dispute. First, the world is a complex system
and therefore a constitution must also be a complex system. Second, human
beings have limited capabilities and therefore researchers in constitution also
only have limited capabilities. No matter how intelligent and knowledgeable
a person is, no one can claim that they can understand everything in this
world or just a part of this complex world. The alternative epistemological
presuppositions developed from these two propositions may help us overcome
the theoretical bar from integrating the different approaches and paradigms
into a bigger analytical framework for understanding constitution.
68 Jonathan Sacks calls this presupposition "Plato's Ghost". See Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity of Differ-
ence: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations (London, New York: Continuum, 2002), Ch 3: The
Dignity of Difference: Exorcizing Plato's Ghost.
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The concepts of "system" and "complexity" are borrowed from the general
system theory.69 A systems view sees the world as a world full of systems." A
system is understood to be "a complex of interacting elements"n or "a regu-
larly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole.""
This systems worldview provides us a perspective to analyse and under-
stand the wholeness of the world, not only the details in its parts. Through it,
it can be seen how parts are embedded in a bigger system which is also a part
of an even bigger system. Also, it can be appreciated how the connection,
interaction, and interdependence between the parts and the systems work to
make a particular system function."
Applying the systems worldview to constitution shows that a constitution
creates a constitutional system with at least the following elements: textual
elements, institutional elements (the executive authorities, legislature, judi-
ciary and civil services)," ideological or normative elements,75 and political
elements.76
A constitution is not only a system; it is also a complex system. The com-
plexity of a system illustrates the following characteristics: (1) complex systems
consist of a large number of elements; (2) the elements interact in a dynamic
manner; (3) the interaction is fairly rich, ie any element in the system
influences, and is influenced by, quite a few other ones; (4) the interactions
are non-linear; (5) the effect of interactions can feed back onto the elements;
(6) complex systems are usually open systems, ie they interact with their
environment; (7) complex systems operate under conditions far from
equilibrium; (8) complex systems have a history; and (9) each element in the
system is ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole; it responds only
to information that is available to it locally.77 Applying these characteristics
to a constitution, there is little doubt that a constitution must be a very com-
plex system.
69 Ludwig von Bertalanffy is generally regarded as the pioneer of the general system theory. See Ludwig
von Bertalanffy, "An Outline of General System Theory," (1950) 1 British journal for the Philosophy of
Science pp 134-165.
70 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (New York:
George Braziller, 1968), p 3.
71 Bertalanffy, n 69 above, p 143.
72 This is a dictionary definition adopted by Lynn M. Lopucki, "The Systems Approach to Law," (1996)
82 Cornell Law Review 479, at 482.
73 See Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World: A Holistic Vision for Our Time (New Jersey: Hamption
Press, Inc., 1996), pp 10-12.
7 These are the political actors.
75 The constitutional norms incorporated in the constitutional text setting the goals or ideals of the
constitution.
76 These are the choices of the political actors made under the constitutions.
7 Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems (London: Routledge,
1998), pp 3-5.
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Understanding the complexity of systems, social systems and constitutional
systems highlights the problem of the original epistemological presupposi-
tion. It would not be too rational to insist that there can only be one single
path to understand the reality concerning a system that is very complex.
Therefore, some alternative epistemological presuppositions, which may be
more realistic, can now be suggested.
First, a social system is composed of many distinct components each with
their characteristics, but the components are inseparable for the survival of
the system. A constitutional system has its legal as well as political compon-
ents and they must be inseparable in order for the constitutional system to
function. Therefore, to understand a constitution, a method must be adopted
that can analyse both the legal and political components.
Second, the same event in a complex system could have different dimen-
sions of meaning and significance."8 A constitutional decision may have legal
as well as political consequences. Therefore, to fully appreciate the impact of
a constitutional decision resulting from the interactions between the elements
to the constitutional system itself or with other social systems, a constitution's
multi-dimensional implications must be considered.
Third, the truth or reality may be reached or discovered by not just
one method or one single path. To make a decision concerning constitution,
a form of legal or political reasoning might produce the same conclusion.
There is no need to exclude other paths to reality in our understanding of
constitution.
Fourth, researchers may observe a phenomenon from different perspect-
ives. What they can derive from the observation will depend on the vantage
point at which they position themselves and from which they observe. Differ-
ent researchers (legal and political), depending on their academic orientation,
may have adopted different vantage points to approach a constitutional ques-
tion. Different conclusions might be reached but this does not mean that one
is right and the other must be wrong. They could be arrived at from different
perspectives and considering all the conclusions complementarily may enrich
our understanding of the reality.
Fifth, even if researchers adopt the same perspective, they may have
different perceptions of the same phenomenon owing to the different
78 Hommes applying the theory of Herman Dooyeweerd identifies the following dimensions (aspects)
in any matter in the world: numerical, spatial, kinematic, physical, biological, sensory, logical-
analytical, cultural-historical, symbolic or linguistic, social, economic, aesthetic, legal (juridical),
ethical and fiduciary. See Hendrik Jan van Eikema Hommes, Major Trends in the History of Legal
Philosophy (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1979) Ch 15 and
Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. 1: The Necessary Presuppositions of
Philosophy (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris; Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1953 -1958)
Prolegomena, pp 22-165.
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pre-understanding, background, training and concern of the researchers.
Through personal reflection on the differing reasoning and conclusions of
other researchers, the subjective factors which might have distorted our percep-
tion and understanding of the reality may be exposed. It can also enable a
deeper appreciation of the concerns of other researchers which may have
been overlooked.
Sixth, the natural limitations on the capacity and ability of an individual
researcher (or even a team of researchers) restrict most studies to a narrow
scope of the phenomenon. Legal and political science scholars can only
approach a narrow scope of a constitution. Working together can provide
more pieces of the constitutional jigsaw puzzle.
Seventh, the reality is never static and is, in fact, ever-changing though it
may appear to have not changed for a long time. However, the impression of
the lengthiness of the period is only considered from the perspective of the
researchers. Researchers are also limited by time. In most situations, they can
only study a phenomenon observable at a specific moment. Even if they can
study a matter's behaviour in a time period, that time period cannot be too
long (at least not longer than the life of the researcher).
The legal or the political nature of a constitution may seem to be more
explicitly influential on the constitutional process during a certain period
of the life of a constitution but as the constitutional process is also ever-
changing, the originally more explicit element may give way to another. If
legal or political science researchers observe only a certain period of the
life of the constitution," they may reach a wrong conclusion on the actual
impact that the legal or political element could have upon the constitutional
process in the whole lifespan of the constitution. Joining the legal and polit-
ical research together will allow a more thorough understanding of the
evolutionary process of the constitution.
These epistemological presuppositions: multi-component, multi-dimension,
multi-path, multi-perspective, multi-perception, multi-scope and multi-
period would justify an attempt to integrate the different approaches and
paradigms. Surely, if they are incommensurableso to such a degree that even
7 They might ignore certain periods of the constitutional process since the element of the constitution
which is the orientation of their research might not be too active during those periods. As a result,
those periods would not be interesting enough for them to conduct an in-depth analysis.
80 The concept of incommensurability was first raised by Thomas Kuhn, the historian on science, claiming
that different paradigms are incommensurable. See Kuhn, n 7 above, p 148. Derek L. Philip provides
a critique of the incommensurability of paradigms and concludes that different paradigms need not
be incommensurable on the condition that the paradigms are not postulated as totally closed systems.
See Derek L. Philip, "Paradigms and Incommensurability," (1975) 2 Theory and Society 37, at 60.
Kuhn later modified his position on incommensurability in "Commensurability, Comparability, and
Communicability," Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol 1982,
Vol Two, pp 669-688.
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these presuppositions could not help, this attempt to integrate may still fail.
Therefore, how incommensurable they are must now be examined."8
(b) Integration of the Approaches of the Legal Paradigm
If a political actor has to interpret a constitutional provision, he or she may
have to choose one particular interpretation approach to assist him or her in
determining the meaning to be given to the constitutional text and make
decisions accordingly to resolve the constitutional question encountered.
Seeing merely for the purpose of making decisions concerning constitu-
tion, the various approaches of the legal paradigm seem to be incommensurable
because most political actors will only rely on one approach to interpretation
at a time though it is possible that several approaches of interpretation could
reach the same conclusion on the meaning to be given to the constitutional
text.
However, this is not the only way for these legal approaches to be use. If,
instead of "how can a decision be made to resolve a constitutional dispute
by applying the constitutional provision?", we ask "what are the options
available in resolving a constitutional dispute?" or "what is the theoretical
basis of each of the options?" or "why has a particular option been chosen
in resolving a particular dispute?" or "which is the best option?" or "is the
option a legitimate one under the present constitutional context?", then
these approaches would not be incommensurable in a sense that only one
can be right and the others must be wrong and have to be excluded.82
Presenting all the approaches together in a form of pluralistic theory of
constitutional interpretation" will help the understanding of the complexity
of legal reasoning of constitutional provisions and the interdependence of
legal approaches with external standards and considerations.
(c) Integration of Approaches of the Political Paradigm
It seems that political scientists are more receptive to the political approaches
advanced by their fellow colleagues. As they face no immediate need to make
a decision in resolving a constitutional dispute and the main objective of
81 If the conflicts between the approaches or paradigms involve some fundamental values that are in-
commensurable other than on the philosophical methods, the approaches and paradigms might be
more difficult to incorporate into one's analytical framework. For the concept of incommensurable
values, see John Alder, "Incommensurable Values and Judicial review: The Case of Local Govern-
ment," (2001) Public Law pp 711-735 and Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986) Ch 13: Incommensurability. However, even if the approaches and paradigms are devel-
oped on the basis of some incommensurable values, this does not mean that there is no possibility
that these could not be compatible with each other at least in the sense that people with incommen-
surable values could still live peacefully within the same community and cooperate to build the
community together.
82 See Bobbit, n 8, Ch 5: Justifying and Deciding and Stephen M. Griffin, "Pluralism in Constitutional
Interpretation (1994) 72 Texas Law Review 1753, at 1767.
83 Griffin, n 82 above.
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their studies is to discover why a decision concerning constitution is made
or provide guidance for decision making in the future, the need to make an
exclusive claim is less pressing than it is for lawyers.
Comparing the first edition 4 of Segal and Spaeth's classic text on the
attitudinal approach with their second edition,15 one will find that they have
added a substantial section on the influence of rational choice theory to the
development of the attitudinal approach. Segal later also makes the follow-
ing comment:
"In sum, outside of the decision on the merits, attitudinal works, broadly
defined, very much resemble many of the strategic-choice hypotheses of
more recent vintages."86
The contribution of the attitudinalists is also well recognised by followers
of the institutional approach and the strategic approach. They all agree with
the finding of the attitudinalists that decisions concerning constitutions,
especially judicial decisions, are political decisions and the Court in making
such decisions is also a policy-making body. They only disagree that the claims
of the attitudinalists cannot be complete and adequate explanations of con-
stitutional decision-making."
The difference between the institutional approach and the strategic
approach is also not as substantial as one thinks. Speaking on behalf of the
institutional approach, Gillman said,
"We agree that there are advantages to explore the ways in which judicial
decision-making is influenced, constrained, or constituted by institutional
contexts. We also agree ... that our accounts should emphasize 'the polit-
ical elements institutional development' and not merely 'organizational
logic' or functionalism.... And so the benefits of rational choice institu-
tionalism [strategic approach] should not be discounted on the grounds
that it does not explain everything about institutional politics and the
new historical institutionalism [institutional approach] should not be dis-
counted on the grounds that it uses data that is not machine readable and
feels no need to translate explanations into models.""8
84 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge
University Press, 1993), Ch 2.
85 Segal and Spaeth, n 11 above, Ch 3.
86 Segal, n 31 above, p 239.
87 Jack Knight, "The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model," (1994) 75 Law and Courts Spring
Issue, p 5 and Rogers M. Smith, "The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model," (1994) 75 Law and
Courts Spring Issue, p 8.
88 Gillman, n 63 above, p 10.
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Both followers of the institutional approach"9 and the strategic approach"o
agree that the two approaches are complementary. Even when they compete
with each other, the competition could be a healthy one with each trying to
demonstrate that it "is doing the most work"" without excluding the con-
tribution of the other. What Gillman said on the relationship between the
approaches seems fitting:
"No single method can illuminate everything we might be interested in
knowing, and this means that we should evaluate the strengths and weak-
nesses of various approaches by asking whether they give us satisfying
answers to particular questions."92
(d) Integration of the Legal and Political Paradigms
For those within the same paradigm, trying to integrate may still be easy;
but for those from totally different paradigms, an intuitive presumption may
be that they are inherently incompatible.
Fortunately, there are people who are already working to integrate law
and politics. Barry Friedman is a professor of law at the New York University
School of Law. He provides an alternative view on the relationship between
law and politics: "Politics and law are not separated, they are symbiotic."93 He
suggests that legal scholars do not need to resist any political project outright.
He finds that the political paradigm could illuminate "rich veins even in the
well-mined field of traditional normative and doctrinal scholarships."94
With the insights from the political paradigm, legal scholars can continue
to do their primary work in formulating normative constitutional doctrines
but in a new way. They could take up a new challenge by "designing workable
doctrine"" rather than indulging in designing doctrines for an ideal world
out of touch with the issues of "practical implementation" and "realities of
political trends."96 He challenges other legal scholars to make use of the findings
from political scientists and develop new constitutional theories."
Even among the existing legal approaches, it can be found that some of
the political considerations have already been explicitly or implicitly consid-
ered. Just by referring back to the six legal approaches identified by Bobbitt, it
is not difficult to find the concerns of institutionalists (old and new) in the
89 Theda Skocpol, "Why I am an Historical Institutionalist" (1995) 28 Polity 103, at 106.
90 Morris Fiorinal, "Rational Choice and the New (?) Institutionalism" (1995) 28 Polity 109, at 110.
91 Rogers M. Smith, "Ideas, Institutions, and Strategic Choices" (1995) 28 Polity pp 135-140.
92 Gillman, n 63 above, p 10.
93 Friedman, n 6 above, p 333.
94 Friedman, n 6 above, p 262.
95 Friedman, n 6 above, p 3 3 7.
96 Friedman, n 6 above, p 336. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Implementing the Constitution (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2001).
97 Friedman, n 6 above, pp 331-337.
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historical, structural, ethical, and the doctrinal approaches. These approaches
all require the political actors to infer the meaning of the constitutional text
from matters embedded in the formal or informal institutions established
directly or indirectly by the constitution.
Attitudinalists' emphasis on ideological values is not too different from
the ethical approach which legitimises political actors referring to political or
moral ideologies which they believe to be the ethos of the society as the basis
of their interpretation of the constitutional text. In the process of identifying
the ethos of the society, it may not be easy for the political actors to separate
their personal values from those values they identified as the values of the
society.
It will also not be too difficult for followers of the prudential approach to
befriend followers of the strategic approach as both must find cost-benefit
analysis the most useful analytical tool. The loneliest ones may be the follow-
ers of the textual approach. However, even for them, the meaning of the
constitutional text may in some cases be found within or determined by their
interpretive communities which can also be a form of institution.
Similarly, legal considerations can be found in the analysis of the political
approaches" though Friedman warns that they should take law more seri-
ously.99 The ideological attitude of the political actors can be a sincere
commitment to follow the original understandings of the constitutional
fathers and need not be some kind of political value.
The text of the constitution and the accompanying norms as understood
and enriched by an interpretive community applying whatever approaches of
legal interpretation is surely a part of the institution in a wide (or new) sense.
To follow the textual meaning of the constitution as far as possible may
be a strategic constraint upon political actors as they may be expected to be
doing so or their decisions concerning constitution may only be legitimate if
they can demonstrate that they are so doing.
Therefore, the legal and political paradigms actually are not that far apart
and there are already many points of contact which can be used as seedbeds
for a full-scale integration to take place. However, before finally moving
on to integrate the two paradigms, some last words about integration have to
be said.
(e) Some Thoughts on Integration
Integration presumes the existence of at least two distinct matters and it
is about how they are linked together. The process of integration is not
98 See John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, "A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation," (1992)
22 International Review of Law and Economics, pp 263-279.
9 Barry Friedman, "Taking Law Seriously," (2006) 4 Perspectives on Politics pp 261-276.
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automatic. 100 It requires a judgment regarding the guiding value for the inte-
gration which, in turn, will affect how the matters are integrated and the
extent of their integration.o In other words, the answer to the question of
why integration happens underlies the answers for the questions of what to
integrate and how to integrate. 102
If the objective of integrating the legal and political paradigms of con-
stitution is just developing a more comprehensive understanding, then the
methodology for integration to be adopted in this project does not need to be
so demanding as to require a complete blending of the two paradigms into a
new paradigm.
The legal and political paradigms can basically maintain their own
entities and the contribution of each can still be recognisable in the analyt-
ical framework that will be developed in this integration project. Surely, this
is not the only way to integrate the two paradigms as one may have an inte-
grated product that has a lesser or a higher degree of integration.
In addition, the proportion of the ingredients may also vary depending on
the taste of the chef or the customers. Even if the methodology is the same,
the resulting integrated product may still be strong in a particular flavour,
legal or political. As this author is trained in the law, the integrated analyt-
ical framework may still be considered to be too legal by political scientists.
Ironically, some legal scholars may at the same time feel that it is too polit-
ical. These may be criticisms that an integrationist or interdisciplinarian must
live with.
However, the reward from participating in an integration project will surely
outweigh these aspects. It may provide a valuable opportunity for a researcher
in a particular discipline to reflect on some taken for granted "truths" in their
discipline." 3 To some, this may even transform their thinking of the subject
and new perspectives or innovative methodologies may be developed.I Even
if all these cannot be achieved, a researcher can at least know how much they
do not know."os
100 Pickens E. Harris, "Philosophic Aspects of Integration," in L. Thomas Hopkins (ed) Integration:
Its Meaning and Application (New York, London: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937), p 50.
101 Moti Nissani, "Fruits, Salad, and Smoothies: A working definition of Interdisciplinarity," (1995) 29
Journal of Educational Thought 121, at 125.
102 For the four methods used in integration or interdisciplinary study, see Julie Thompson Klein,
Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990)
pp 6 4-65.
103 Moran, Joe, Interdisciplinarity (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p 182.
104 Ibid.
105 Moti Nissani, "Ten Cheers for Interdisciplinarity: The Case for Interdisciplinary Knowledge and
Research," (1997) 34 The Social Science Journal 201, at 210.
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3. An Integrated Analytical Framework for Understanding
Constitution: A Constitutional Game 106
The integrated analytical framework for understanding constitution that is
suggested in this article is a kind of game framework.107 This can illustrate
how political actors, in an occasion where a constitutional decision is de-
manded or expected, interact with the constitutional text, the constitutional
or institutional contexts and other political actors resulting in a constitu-
tional decision that has an impact on the short- and long-term development
of the constitutional system. To put it in a more easily accessible form, this
analytical framework is called "a constitutional game".
To be consistent with the epistemological presuppositions stated above, it
is not claimed that this analytical framework is complete or even comprehen-
sive though this concept of constitutional game could provide a more coherent
framework to help understand the complexity of the practices of any consti-
tutional system.
Like all games, a constitutional game must have these basic features:108 (a)
players; (b) rules of the game; (c) winning goals; (d) game resources; (e) playing
field; (f) game actions; (g) interaction; (h) strategy; and (i) end of the game.
(a) Players of the Constitutional Game
To have a game there must be players and in most games there will be more
than one player. The players in a constitutional game can basically be identified
within the constitution. The institutions in the constitutional systeml09 and
106 From the title, one can already see the influence of the strategic approach of the political paradigm.
See n 63 above.
107 The strategic approach is very close to the game theory which is a branch of applied mathematics
studying strategic interaction of individuals. These studies start off as scientific projects aiming at
giving explanation to structures and rules for how individuals' decisions and acts are interrelated or
predicting what strategic options are available to an individual in a specific situation of strategic
interaction. Based on certain assumptions on rationality of individual choices, these game theoret-
ical models or applications of these models specify the relevant parameters that will be manipulated
by the players in the game and adopt deductive analysis to gain an understanding of specific aspects
of different social phenomena. However, this study will only follow the game theory to the extent
that it constructs a game framework where different players in the constitutional process interact
with the other players strategically. It will not develop game theoretical models or apply a game
theoretical model to predict the choices of players in a particular circumstance as most studies apply-
ing game theory do.
108 For definitions of game, see Chris Crawford, The Art of Computer Game Design (Berkeley, Calif.:
Osborne/McGraw-Hill, 1984), Ch 1: What is a Game; E.M. Avedon, "The Structural Elements of
Games," in Elliott M. Avedon and Brian Sutton-Smith (eds) The Study of Games (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971); Kevin Langdon, "What is a Game?" http://www.polymath-systems.conV
games/whatgame.html (last visited 4 Aug 2007); and Wolfgang Kramer, "What is a game, really?"
The Game Journal, http://www.thegamesjournal.com/articles/WhatsaGame.shtml (last visited 4 Aug
2007).
109 For an example of how different constitutional institutions interact in a constitutional game, see
Jeffrey Segal, "Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts," (1997)
91 American Political Science Review pp 28-44.
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other political actors referred to directly or indirectly by the constitution are
usually the main players of the game.110
A constitutional game in a typical Western liberal constitution has the
president or/and the prime minister, the parliament, the supreme court or the
constitutional court, and the bureaucracy as the main players. "' A new player
can join a constitutional game if it has a significant role to play in the game
after some fundamental changes in the social and political contexts.
There is an assumption that the players enjoy at least a certain degree
of autonomy from the other players for a constitutional game to be played. If
not, not many interesting things will happen in a constitutional game. For-
tunately, in most constitutional systems, even in constitutional systems that
are authoritarian, some form of separateness between the institutions still
exist, qualifying them to be players in a constitutional game.
The Constitution as the Rules of the Game
All games have rules and the constitution is the rules for a constitutional
game. In a purely political game, only power matters,' but in a constitu-
tional game the constitution provides a set of binding rules for the game and
all players accept being bound by the constitution when they join the game.
This is the most important thing that distinguishes a constitutional game
from a purely political game. In other words, players' willingness to be bound
by the constitution is a precondition of a constitutional game.113
In theory, the rules of any game must clearly set out what the roles of the
players in the game are, how the players can win and actions the players can
take in the game. If not, disputes will naturally arise and a game cannot be
played effectively without such clear provisions.
However, this may not be the case for the constitution as it sets the rules
of the game in a constitutional game. Though a constitution will also set out
for every player their role, game resources and limitations on game actions
110 The prominent role to be played by institutions in a constitutional game is borrowed from the insti-
tutionalists of the political paradigm.
11 See n 63 above. See also John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan, "Congressional Influence on Bureau-
cracy," (1990) 6Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization pp 1-20; JonathanR. Macey, "Separated
Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies," (1991) 80
Geo. L. J. pp 671-703; and Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police versus Fire Alarms," (1984) 28 AmericanJournal of Political Science pp 165-179.
112 In this understanding, there is no condition on how the constitution was made. When the constitu-
tion is respected by all players so that it has a binding effect upon their acts, a political game becomes
a constitutional game. However, as will be illustrated by Hong Kong's constitutional game, a player
in a game may set the rules of the constitution in such a way that it is vested with almost all powers
under the constitution. This kind of constitutional game will be played quite differently from games
where no player in the game has such overwhelming powers. It will be very easy for this kind of game
to relapse back to being a purely political game where winning or losing is decided only by crude
power. In other words, the rule of law and constitutionalism are conditions for a constitutional game.
113 This is also the presumption of the legal paradigm and its relevance in constitutional analysis is
therefore clearly demonstrated.
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they can take in the game, the main difference between a constitutional game
and other games is that a constitution in many cases cannot accurately or
clearly define the roles, powers and limits of the players in the constitutional
game.
This is mainly caused by the ambiguity inherent in constitutional language.
In such occasions where language cannot indicate what the exact roles, powers
and limits of the players are, players will be left with a certain amount of room
to choose what they want to do, what they can do, and what actual actions
they will take in the game. This room within a constitution for players to make
use of is the very special thing that makes constitutional decision making so
complex and studying constitution so difficult but also so interesting.
Giving a certain interpretation or reading to the constitutional text is one
of the main forms of action of a player in a constitutional game and resolving
competing interpretations of the constitution by the players is one of the
main forms of interaction between the players. Constitutional interpretation
is, therefore, the key of a constitutional game.
(c) Winning Goals of Players
Like all games, players in a constitutional game play to win. "I In most games,
the winning goal of all players is the same; obtaining the highest score. Usu-
ally, there may only be one winner in the game and the game will end when
a player wins.
However, the winning goals for the players in a constitutional game may
not be the same."' The winning goal of each player is basically set out by the
constitution. A player's winning goal is very much related to the institutional
role assigned by the constitution."' This refers to the institutional role of a
player in a constitution as so perceived by the player as their constitutional
position in a constitutional game. By ascertaining their constitutional posi-
tion, a player in a constitutional game can define their winning goals.
The winning goal of a player may be very complicated, e.g. may cause the
constitutional system to actualise certain substantial values in the society on
the basis of the player's ideological beliefs. The goal may also be as simple as
just ensuring the terms of the constitution (no matter what) are followed by
all players.
114 This idea of making a constitutional decision as if it is a player who plays to win in a game clearly
originates from the strategic approach of the political paradigm.
115 Winning a game is closely related to how a game ends. As the winning goals of players in a constitu-
tional game may not be the same, there may be more than one winner in a constitutional game and
a constitutional game may not end when a player wins. See the discussion below on the end of the
game.
116 It is not difficult to see the influence of the institutionalists of the political paradigm in this relation-
ship between a constitution, institutions established by the constitution, roles of the players,
constitutional positions of the players and the winning goals of the players.
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Another special thing about the winning goals of players in a constitu-
tional game is that they may not be constant. The constitution may assign a
particular constitutional position to a player with the accompanying winning
goals. However, because of the indeterminacy of the constitutional text to
definitely and exclusively define the constitutional position of the players,
the language of the constitution will always allow some room for an indi-
vidual political actor as a player in the game to refine or develop their
constitutional positions. Their winning goals may also be refined accordingly
on the condition that they do not conflict directly with the positions and
goals explicitly provided in the constitution and are considered to be legitim-
ate by other players.
A player's personal ideological values may influence how they define their
constitutional positions and prioritise their goals in the game. The institu-
tional context may also have a similar influence upon a player.117
For example, the constitution may give the court the power to review
administrative actions and the constitution may set that the basic goal for
such review is to ensure that the administration acts are within the legal
boundary of the empowering statutes. The court's winning goal in the game is
to ensure the administrative bodies act within the legal boundary. However,
there may still be room for the court to further develop the concept of legality
and it may incorporate the concept of rationality or even proportionality into
the concept of legality enriching it to such an extent that the court may
achieve more winning goals than the one expressly provided by the constitu-
tion. The constitutional position of the court may then not be just a guardian
of legality but a vanguard for good governance.
Refining constitutional positions and winning goals within the room
allowed or provided for by the constitution is actually part of the game
actions, interactions and strategies of the players in a constitutional game.
(d) Game Resources of the Players
Players come to a game with certain capabilities of their own or they may
possess different levels of skills. The game will allocate to each of the players
equal or unequal game resources which they can utilise to win the game. For
example, in any card game, a player will be given a certain number of cards
randomly and each card will enable the player to take different actions in the
game depending on the rules of the game. Some players may have more re-
sources and their chance of winning the game will be enhanced.
It is the same situation in a constitutional game that players come to the
game with different capabilities of their own and different levels of skills. The
constitution may also allocate equal or unequal constitutional powers (games
117 The influence of the attitudinalists and the institutionalists can be felt here.
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resources) which they can make use of by applying their personal capabilities
and skills so as to attain their winning goals in the game. A parliament can
make laws, but a president can veto those laws. A constitutional court can
invalidate a law by exercising its constitutional review power. These are all
typical examples of game resources available to different players in a constitu-
tional game.
Apart from enabling players to refine their constitutional positions and
winning goals, a constitution may allow some room for the players to refine
what game resources they could use. For example, in exercising their powers
to review legislation, a constitutional court may further develop what kind
of constitutional remedies they can provide to a successful challenge of the
constitutionality of a law especially if the constitution is silent on this.
(e) Game Actions
All players in a game act in a particular way in order to win. However, not all
actions by a player are allowed by the rules of a game as there are limitations
on the players' actions.
As the constitution plays such an important role in a constitutional game,
it should come as no surprise that most game actions concern constitutional
decision making. Game actions in a constitutional game may include deci-
sions on what provisions will be included in a constitution and how to express
the provisions to ensure their goals will be achieved; what statute has to be
made to implement the provisions of the constitution; how to exercise pow-
ers granted by the statute or the constitution to implement the provisions of
the constitution; how the provisions of the constitution should be interpreted;
what ruling should be given in adjudicating a constitutional dispute; which
provisions in the constitution need to be amended and how they are to be
amended.
In a constitutional game, because the constitutional positions and winn-
ing goals of the players are not the same, the specific actions they can take in
constitutional decision making also differ. The players need to take these
specific actions on constitutional decision making so that they can achieve
their winning goals in the constitutional game.
Similarly, the constitution in a constitutional game also imposes limits on
the kind of actions players can take. Every player must act in the game
according to the constitution. Instead of using raw power to gain maximum
benefits for themselves, all players have to play in conformity with the consti-
tution to win. Free fights between the players are not allowed in a constitutional
game but they are not banned from doing so in a purely political game."I
118 The significance of the constitution as a set of rules setting out what game actions are allowed originates
from the legal paradigm.
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Again, the constitution may not be specific enough to state what the ex-
act limits on their actions are. In addition to the room given in the constitution
for players to refine their constitutional positions with the accompanying
winning goals and the constitutional powers (their game resources) they have
in the game, there is also room for players to apply their understanding to the
constitutional limits on their actions and refine these actions so that they
may act beyond what the constitution expressly allows.
Because of the constitutional room accorded to players to refine their
positions and powers, providing an interpretation of the constitutional text is
the main form of action that all players take in a constitutional game. This
action may precede all their other actions in the constitutional game as play-
ers need to offer an interpretation of certain provisions in the constitution to
justify their specific actions. In most cases, the interpretations are related
with how they understand the constitutional provisions in relation to their
positions and powers.
However, the player cannot arbitrarily choose any legal method of inter-
pretation and meaning for the text. They are still under internal and external
constraints as determined by the institutional contexts of the constitution.
The constitutional text provides room for different interpretations but it
also sets boundaries for interpretations a player can give. Each player will
adopt a certain legal approach of interpretation and a particular meaning for
the constitutional text that can best advance their constitutional position
but this position will also impose constraints on the approach of interpreta-
tion and specific interpretation they will adopt. This is the internal constraint.
The interpretation chosen cannot conflict with the specific constitutional
position adopted by the player.
The language of the constitutional text is an external constraint. It would
be very difficult for a player to justify an interpretation if the meaning adopted
was a meaning that the language cannot bear. Another external constraint is
the pressure generated from the interpretations by the other players who are
also under their internal constraints. Depending on the relative powers and
limitations in a constitutional game, a player may have to adjust even their
legal approach to interpretation as a result of strategic interactions with the
interpretations of other players. Constitutional interpretation is, therefore,
part of a player's winning strategy in a constitutional game.119
(f) Playing Fields
Players' game actions must happen within the boundary of a certain defined
playing field. As the game actions of players in a constitutional game are all
119 See further discussion below on playing fields, interaction and strategy in a constitutional game.
The emphasis of using legal platforms as the playing fields is also under the influence of the legal
paradigm.
Vol 37 Part 2
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 529 2007
530 Benny Y.T. Tai
related with constitutional decision making, it is natural to find the playing
fields of a constitutional game in venues where the making, implementation,
interpretation, adjudication and amendment of the constitution take place.
The playing field of a constitutional game may be a constitutional convention,
a meeting of the constitution's drafters, a cabinet meeting, an administrative
official's office, a meeting with citizens by administrative officials, a legislature's
chamber, a courtroom, or a referendum.
One common thing about all these playing fields is that they are all basically
legal platforms. The consideration of legality plays a very important role in a
legal platform in the sense that decisions made in the platform are expected
either to be expressed in legal terms or reached on the basis of certain legal
codes. A legal platform is a process where legality plays a major role in legitimis-
ing an action and an action's legality will be determined. Legality here is the
concern expressed by the legal paradigm of constitution stated above. 120
Different playing fields or legal platforms may involve different kinds of
game actions. Some players may only be allowed by the constitution to act
in certain playing fields. Different legal platforms may also have different pro-
cesses of legitimatisation and specific requirements in determining an action's
legality.
After a constitution is made and the constitutional game starts, the main
playing fields of a constitutional game are in the implementation, interpreta-
tion and adjudication stages. In these playing fields, based on how they see
their own constitutional positions and winning goals, players will utilise the
constitutional powers which they understand to be available for them to use
and make constitutional decisions which they believe to be within the limits
set by the constitution.
The nature of the playing fields as legal platforms imposes further con-
straints on the actions of the players in a constitutional game. Even though
a player may have some room to determine their constitutional position, powers
and limits, any action taken must be recognised as a legitimate act by other
players. As the actions are taken in a legal platform, they must at the end find
legal authority from the constitution and this must likewise be recognised by
the other players in accordance with the specific requirements on legality of
that particular legal platform.
Though political bargaining and strategies may still be needed in consti-
tutional decision making, other players of the game will apply and enforce
the legal terms of the constitution and the specific requirements on the legal-
ity of that legal platform and determine whether the action in question is
legal and therefore legitimate.
120 The emphasis of using legal platforms as the playing fields is also under the influence of the legal
paradigm.
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As mentioned above, players will have to give an interpretation to the
constitutional text before they take other actions in the game so as to justify
those actions. Therefore, the interpretation given by a player will also have
to be considered by other players to be a legitimate interpretation in the legal
platform in which the need for constitutional decision making arises.
Illegitimate actions by any player may be counteracted by other players. A
player may be paralysed from taking further action in the game or be forced
by other players to abandon an illegitimate action and get back on the right
track if they still want to stay in the game. This is how the players interact in
a constitutional game.
A typical example is how a constitutional court in a constitutional adjudica-
tion applies the constitutional provision to determine whether a legislative
act is unconstitutional. The constitutional court exercises its constitutional
review power under the constitution to determine whether the legislative act
is unconstitutional, but the manner of how the constitutional court exercises
this power must also be considered as legal and legitimate by other players in
the sense that the constitutional court is acting within the goals, powers and
limits set by the constitution.
(g) Interaction between the Players
Interaction between the players is the key to any game, including a constitu-
tional game. Players act within the playing field but they do not act alone.
Any action by a player will immediately attract reactions from the other play-
ers and their actions are to block the way to obtaining the winning goal if it
causes a conflict with their winning goals or would cause them to lose the
game. A player must also immediately respond to the reactions of other play-
ers. Therefore, interaction in a game is a continuous process of actions and
reactions between the players.
The interaction in a constitutional game is the same. As mentioned above,
the main form of action of players in a constitutional game is to provide con-
stitutional interpretations of the constitutional text to justify their specific
actions. These specific actions are needed for obtaining their winning goals
in the game. As the playing fields of a constitutional game are legal platforms,
other players can react by considering these acts as legally illegitimate. The
main form of reaction from other players will include competing interpreta-
tions of the constitutional provisions and accompanying specific actions.
If a player makes certain constitutional decisions on the basis of their in-
terpretation of the constitution which is related to their position or power
but is considered to be legally illegitimate by some other players, they will
respond by making another constitutional decision to cancel out the first
decision on the basis of their constitutional interpretation of the constitution
in pursuance of their positions and powers.
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A law passed by the parliament may be vetoed by the president who be-
lieves the law is unconstitutional. The parliament may override the veto by a
special majority but the constitutionality of the law may be further challenged
in the constitutional court. The constitutional court may declare such a law
unconstitutional but a referendum may be held to amend the constitution
with the effect of endorsing the invalidated law. All these interactions be-
tween the players happen within the framework of the constitution, but they
also originate from the different readings of the constitution by the players.
As a constitutional game emphasises legality, players in the playing fields
all apply a notion of legality to judge the legitimacy of the other player's
action. However, legal legitimacy is only one aspect of legitimacy. Fallon sug-
gests that in addition to legal legitimacy, there are also sociological legitimacy
and moral legitimacy.121
Legal legitimacy looks at the legality of an action and if an action is
considered to be illegal or to have contravened legal norms, the act will be
illegitimate. Legal legitimacy may be the basic requirement of legitimacy. The
mere fact that an act has complied with the legal requirements on content
and process will already bestow on it at least a certain level of legitimacy no
matter what the actual content is. However, a legally valid act may still be
considered as illegitimate or an illegal act may be legitimate if we see legit-
imacy beyond legality.
The notion of sociological legitimacy does not refer to what makes an
act legitimate but only captures the actual attitude of a person towards an act.
A person's acquiescence to an act may indicate that they accept the legit-
imacy of that act no matter what causes their acceptance.
Sociological legitimacy can have different degrees. People may accept
the legitimacy of an act because they personally support the act. People may
accept by convention because most other people also accept. They may
accept out of habit or accept merely out of indifference. People may accept
but only reluctantly if their negative sentiment is not strong enough to cause
them to object to it. Even people who do not accept the legitimacy of an act
may still give an impression that they accept the legitimacy until and unless
they take any overt action to object to it.122
Moral legitimacy goes back to examine what causes a person to accept the
legitimacy of an act. It looks at legitimacy from the perspective of moral
justifiability. As Fallon points out: "Even if a regime or decision enjoys broad
support, or if a decision is legally correct, it may be illegitimate under a moral
concept if morally unjustified."1 3
121 Richard Fallon, "Legitimacy and the Constitution," (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review pp 1789-1853.
122 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p 238.
123 Fallon, (n 120 above), p 1796.
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There is no space to examine the different theories of moral legitimacy
here. What is relevant to this discussion is that beyond legal legitimacy, which
is very much emphasised by the playing fields in a constitutional game, con-
siderations of sociological and moral legitimacy may also cause reactions from
other players in the game.
The room in a constitution for players to refine their positions, powers and
limits provides space for the consideration of sociological and moral legit-
imacy to influence actions and reactions of players. There may be situations
in which an action of a player may not seem to be legally legitimate, but the
degree of illegitimacy to another player may not be strong enough that they
may choose not to react against it and accommodate it by giving an alter-
native reading to the constitution which may not be the preferred one.
In another situation, a player's act may be legally legitimate, but there
may be another player who considers that the act is morally illegitimate
according to their theory of moral justification and they will react against the
act. However, in all these situations where the legality of act cannot resolve
the differences between the players," all players must still put their views in
legal terms as legal legitimacy is still the ultimate standard on legitimacy to
be applied in the playing field. They will utilise the room for alternative in-
terpretations of the constitution to justify their actions, inaction and reactions.
If these other notions of legitimacy are not included in this analysis, it will
fail to show the political aspects of a constitutional game and cannot explain
the behaviour of players in the game. 125
(h) Strategy
In a game, players will develop strategies that can maximise their chance of
winning. All players in a constitutional game will also have their winning
strategies.
Players will strategically use their resources in their interactions with other
players in order that their winning goals can be attained. Players may need to
adjust or refine their original strategies and in some cases, may even have to
adopt a completely different strategy.
In making constitutional decisions in a constitutional game, players will
try their best to justify their actions by giving an expansive reading to the
constitution which can best fit their winning goals and accompanying actions.
All players will play according to their understanding of the constitution and
strive to win the game through exerting influence upon other players by their
124 These situations may not be common in a constitutional game or in the day-to-day operation of a
constitutional system, but it cannot be denied that they often arise when there is constitutional
controversy or dispute and often may have a long-lasting impact on the development of the constitu-
tional system.
125 The political paradigm has a very important contribution to this part of the analysis.
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game resources to accept their reading of the constitution in the legal plat-
forms. This may be a player's basic strategy.
However, such actions by a player may attract reactions from other players
who will block their way to achieve their own goals. They must also develop
a strategy in the game that can avoid other players who are trying to prevent
them from winning the game.
As can be seen, the understanding of the constitutional provisions by a
player on their own positions, powers and limitations may not be the same or
may even be in conflict with how other players in the game perceive these
things. Owing to the ambiguity inherent in constitutional provisions, players
will tolerate a certain degree of difference in their understanding of each
others' role, powers and limitations. As a result, there is always a varying
degree of room for each player to fine tune their winning strategy which will
not immediately attract a reaction from others. However, if a player moves
beyond that, reactions from other players are expected though the exact
dividing line is drawn differently.
If a player perceives that an act will be considered illegitimate by other
players but still insists on taking that action, they will have to take the risk
that they may be paralysed by other players from playing the game further or
be forced to abandon the action they has taken if they want to stay in the
game unless their game resources make them so strong that they can ignore
any reaction from the other players. A rational player will not take an action
if they perceive that the action will be considered as illegitimate by other
players. This is a more advanced strategy.
However, to do this, a player must know what the reactions of the other
players to their actions would be. If a player could have complete information
about the other players, their chance of winning would be much greater.
However, no player in a game can have complete information. They must
then base their decisions on the incomplete information they have, and pre-
dict what may be the action of the other players.
Therefore, it is important to players in a constitutional game to gather as
much information as possible about the other players. 126 Such information
may be gained through mutual interaction.
The first piece of information that a player must have is about the inter-
pretative approaches adopted by the other players. As the approach of
interpretation to be adopted by a player is determined by their perceived
constitutional position which, in turn, is influenced by the player's ideolog-
ical values and institutional contexts, these are also relevant pieces of
information.
126 For the importance of information in constitutional politics, see Georg Vanberg, n 63 above and
James R. Rogers, "Information and Judicial Review: A Signalling Game of Legislative-Judicial Inter-
action," (2001) 45 American journal of Political Science, pp 84-99.
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Another piece of information that a player needs in a constitutional game
is whether the other players will consider their action to be illegitimate
especially from the perspectives of sociological and moral legitimacy.
As a player's information and perception of the reactions of the other
players reveal themselves to be wrong, their actions or reactions may be
over-conservative or over-aggressive. After many rounds of playing this game,
a player may forecast the possible reactions of other players to their acts. If
they can learn from that, their chance of winning the game increases.
(i) End of the Game
In most games, there is a clear end. But there is no end to a constitutional
game. Players in a constitutional game want the game to be played continu-
ously. A constitutional game will only end when some players are no longer
willing to be bound by the constitution as they perceive that they can never
win in the game. They would then like to reset the whole game by enacting a
new constitution or revoking the constitution.
Therefore, in a constitutional game, no matter what the winning goals
of the other players are, every player will share at least one winning goal in
common, that is to have the game maintained. To do so, each player must
play in such a way that all other players can achieve their winning goals at
least to a certain extent. If not, some players may be so frustrated that they
may choose to end the game by quitting or leaving it. In another words, a
constitutional game is a win-for-all game if it is played well.
Such a state may be called the equilibrium of a constitutional game. If all
players have almost equal game resources in the game, equilibrium will be
achieved through give and take interactions between the players in the legal
platforms. Equilibrium will be maintained through the operation of such a
balancing mechanism. This illustrates how the legal paradigm integrates with
the political paradigm, especially the strategic approach.
However, if all players fail to follow or honour the constitution, the con-
stitutional game will collapse. Either another constitution is made and a new
constitutional game with a new constitution will replace the collapsed one or
a constitutional game will regress to a purely political game.
(j) Constitutional Game as an Analytical Framework
Even if a constitutional game can successfully integrate the legal and political
paradigms of constitution, what values this analytical framework has which
cannot be observed by having the two paradigms of constitution analysed
separately must be examined.
First, using a game framework allows us to understand a constitution not
just from one political actor's perspective but to consider it from the per-
spectives of all political actors, old and new or existing and potential. The
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problem of the legal paradigm is that it only focuses on one political actor,
ie the court, and ignores how other political actors would understand the
constitution.
Second, a major function of this game analytical framework is to demystify
the "sacredness" of the so-called "legal meaning" of constitutional text. Many
people believe that the key to the resolution of constitutional disputes is to
discover the "legal meaning" or the "right answer" of the relevant constitu-
tional text by using the proper rule of interpretation to interpret the relevant
constitutional provision. However, a constitutional game framework shows
that there is no such "one" proper rule of interpretation or "one" right answer.
Different legal meanings may be arrived at after applying the same rule of
interpretation and different rules of interpretation may arrive at the same
legal meaning.
Third, the constitution still plays a central role in a constitutional game as
the rules of the game. The significance of law in constitutional politics is re-
emphasised. If the second reason is a response to the over-legalistic approach
of the legal paradigm, then this is a response to the under-legalistic approach
of the political paradigm. It avoids the problem of the political paradigm which
sees everything only from the perspective of rational calculation, power
struggle, or self interest. There is a fundamental difference between a consti-
tutional game and a purely political game but this might have been overlooked
by the political paradigm.
Fourth, the complexity in the interaction between the constitutional text
and the political actors is exposed. They have a dialectical relationship. One
the one hand, the constitution is the source of authority of the political
actors and sets the legal boundaries for the political actors. On the other
hand, political actors enjoy a certain degree of freedom to redefine the legal
boundaries by making use of the inherent language indeterminacy of the
constitutional text.
The process of interpretation is not as rigid or mechanical as putting in
the right coin and receiving the right product from a slot machine. However,
it also does not mean that the constitutional text can be manipulated by a
political actor to bear any meaning in the interpretation process. The first
view arises from the legal paradigm and the second view arises from the
political paradigm.
The reality is that political actors interpret within the boundaries set by
the constitution but they will make use of the room available in the constitu-
tion to achieve what they can achieve on the basis of their readings of their
constitutional positions assigned by the constitution.
Fifth, the constitutional game analysis provides a framework broad enough
to accommodate various strands of institutional influences upon political
actors (legal and non-legal, formal and informal, symbolic and substantial,
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internal and external) together with their ideological values in accounting
what causes political actors to adopt a particular interpretation of the
constitution.
A constitutional game accepts the important role that institutions play in
influencing the decisions of political actors but it also does not need to adopt
a form of institutional determinism excluding the autonomous and creative
role individual political actors could play in the constitutional process.
Sixth, the notion of rationality in constitutional interpretation is un-
covered which is often hidden in legal analysis. The interaction between the
political actors and their strategic planning provide a lot of explanation on
how they formulate their actual stances and behaviours in constitutional
decision making. Though the explanation may still solely be focused on the
external aspects of the institutional impact, this is already much more than
what has been achieved in the past. Going deeper into the mind of the polit-
ical actors may need the integration of another discipline, psychology, in the
study of constitutional politics.
Constitutional game analysis does not over-emphasise the role of rational
choice as it is considered to be only one of the many factors that affect the
actions of political actors though it may be a very important one. In addition,
it does not limit itself to instrumental rationality and actions taken to fulfil
duties or to serve symbolic functions can be accommodated in the strategic
planning of the political actors.
Seventh, the interaction between political actors and the development of
strategies in a constitutional game open an understanding of the dynamic
aspect of constitutional interpretation and practices. This dynamic nature of
the constitution process has long been discovered by the political paradigm
but is just ignored by the legal paradigm. Legal scholars tend to only see the
constitutional process, and in particular the interpretation process, as a
static process. Their sole concern is whether the political actors, especially
the judges, have found the right method of interpretation and arrived at the
correct meaning.
However, the political paradigm may also have a limitation in this aspect.
It looks mainly at the outcome of the dynamic constitutional process but very
often overlooks the detailed reasoning in the interpretation provided by
the political actors. If it is accepted that the legal text is still a major force
influencing the choices of the political actors, a fuller picture can be arrived
at if legal scholars can introduce a dynamic view in their understanding of
the interpretation of the constitution, and this is how the constitutional game
analysis can contribute to this discourse.
Eighth, even though the constitutional game analysis does not explicitly
mention what substantive values political actors should read into the con-
stitution, some substantive constitutional values are already embedded in the
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constitutional game analysis like rule of law, constitutionalism, separation of
powers and autonomy.
Also, this framework does not prevent researchers (legal or political) from
recommending what substantial values should be embedded in the con-
stitution and the framework may be broad enough to accommodate many
substantive values. Constitutional game analysis only gives a warning to
such normative projects to beware of any institutional constraint which may
make any such prescription unworkable. Normative scholars could then refine
their proposals to have a practical dimension127 as well as an evolutionary
dimension. 12
4. The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong
The game analytical framework will now be applied to the Basic Law and the
constitutional game of Hong Kong will be presented. By understanding
the Basic Law through a game framework, one may gain a more comprehen-
sive view of how the constitutional mechanisms set up by the Basic Law in
Hong Kong have operated in the last 10 years and, in particular, how legal
and political considerations have interacted to produce the state of the con-
stitution as it exists now.
(a) Players of the Constitutional Game of Hong Kong
The main players of the constitutional game of Hong Kong are already pro-
vided by the Basic Law. The Beijing Government has replaced the British
Government in exercising sovereign power in Hong Kong. The Beijing
Government has different capacities in the HKSAR: the National People's
Congress (NPC),129 the Standing Committee of the NPC (NPCSC),130
Central People's Government (CPG)," the People's Liberation Army 3 2 and
the Foreign Office of the CPG.133 Owing to the nature of the government in
China, these different capacities of the Beijing Government will not be con-
sidered as separate players in Hong Kong's constitutional game.
127 Normative scholars can provide practical advice on how to overcome the institutional obstacles that
stand in the way of a successful application of their proposals.
128 With the understanding of the institutional constraints, normative scholars can provide an evolu-
tionary plan for their proposals and the implementation of their proposals can be divided into stages
with each stage having more limited goals. Each stage can aim to transform the institutional contexts
only to an extent so as to prepare for a later stage of development.
129 Basic Law, Preamble, Arts 2, 20, and 159.
130 Basic Law, Arts 17, 18, 20, 158, 159, 160, Annex I and Annex II.
131 Basic Law, Arts 12, 15, 18, 19, 22, 43, 45, 48(3), 48(5), 73(9), 96, 106, 125, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134,
150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157 and Annex I.
132 Basic Law, Art 14.
133 Basic Law, Art 13.
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The political system of the HKSAR to a certain extent is very similar to
the political system under colonial rule.13 1 Many political actors who were
players in the constitutional game under the colonial rule re-entered the con-
stitutional game of Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty in the same or
a different capacity.135 So when the new constitutional game of Hong Kong
started on 1 July 1997, all the players had already lined up to play this new
game.
The First Chief Executive leading the Executive Council, the principal
officials and the civil service form the HKSAR Government. 136
Basically, the main political interest groups in the form of political parties
or loose political coalitions find their political representation in the Legisla-
tive Council (LegCo) and there has been no major change in the last 10 years
except a slight adjustment to the proportion of each one. LegCo is basically
divided into three main camps: the pro-democracy camp,137 the pro-Beijing
camp 38 and the business camp.139 There are also divisions and conflicts within
each camp but in most cases, each camp could act as one single player in the
game.
The Basic Law also provides that the judicial system previously practiced
in Hong Kong is maintained,140 but a new institutional structure has been
added to Hong Kong's judicial system, ie the Court of Final Appeal (CFA). 141
A new and powerful player is added to Hong Kong's constitutional game and
it emerged that the CFA was the most unpredictable player in the early rounds
of Hong Kong's constitutional game.
Throughout these 10 years, there have been several major changes in the
players. The first major change was the replacement of Tung Chee Hwa with
Donald Tsang as the Chief Executive. Tung was the First Chief Executive and
he was re-elected as the Second Chief Executive in 2002 after an uncon-
tested election with overwhelming nominations within the Election
Committee. However, Tung resigned two and a half years later in March 2005
and Tsang was elected to serve Tung's remaining term of two years as the
"new" Second Chief Executive. Tsang was re-elected as the Third Chief
Executive in March 2007 and his term of office will end in 2012.
134 See Ch 4 of the Basic Law.
135 The First Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, was a member of the Executive Council under colonial
rule.
136 In some situations, one may take the HKSAR Government as one single player in the game.
137 It includes the Democratic Party, the Frontier, Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's
Livelihood, Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, the Neighbourhood and Workers' Service
Centre, the Civic Party and the League of Social Democrats.
138 It includes the Democratic Alliance on the Betterment of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Federa-
tion of Trade Unions.
139 It includes the Liberal Party and The Alliance.
140 Basic Law, Arts 19 and 81(2).
141 Basic Law, Arts 2 and 19.
Vol 37 Part 2
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 539 2007
540 Benny Y.T. Tai (2007) HKLJ
Tung and Tsang have very different backgrounds. Tung was a businessman
and had no previous experience in running a government before he took
up the position of Chief Executive of the HKSAR. Tsang has a civil service
background and has more than 30 years of experience in public service. He
was the Chief Secretary for Administration under Tung's Administration.
Tung had a very close relationship with the Chinese Government but Tsang
served in the colonial administration and was even honoured with a knight-
hood by the British Government. Their different backgrounds surely must
have an impact on the constitutional position they adopt as Chief Executive
in this constitutional game.
The second major change is a new player who has joined the game: the
civil society of Hong Kong. When the game started, the civil society of
Hong Kong142 was still generally perceived as apolitical and decentralised. 143
The people of Hong Kong can, and have, freely organised themselves into a
web of associations functioning quite independently from the government,
but there was no record of general political mobilisation except during the
events of 1989.144 Political participation was fragmented and individualis-
tic.145 However, it is also agreed that since the 1980s and 1990s, civil society
had already evolved to a state where it has acquired at least a certain degree
of self-awareness" 6 and political sensitivity."'
The Basic Law has provided the necessary conditions for the civil society
of Hong Kong to grow14 but the entrance of the civil society into the playing
142 The definition of civil society adopted in this study is the definition adopted by the Centre for Civil
Society, London School of Economics and Political Science: "Civil society refers to the arena of
un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional
forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries
between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil
society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their
degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as
registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's
organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups,
social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups."
143 The understanding of civil society adopted in this analysis of a constitutional game is basically a
liberal notion of civil society, emphasising the state vis-a-vis civil society relationship. However, this
relationship is not necessarily confrontational and could also be cooperative, instrumental or institu-
tionally intertwined. The study of civil society in a constitutional game aims to illustrate the role,
capacity, capability and autonomy of the civil society in causing political and constitutional change
in a constitutional system.
'44 Sing Ming. "Mobilization for Political Change - The Pro-democracy Movement in Hong Kong
(1980s-1994)" in Stephen W.K. Chiu and Lui Tai Lok (eds) The Dynamics of Social Movement in
Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp 21-53.
145 Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, "The Attentive Spectators: Political Participation of the Hong Kong
Chinese," (1995) 14 Journal of Northeast Asian Studies pp 3 -25.
146 Ip Po Keung, "Development of Civil Society in Hong Kong: Constraints, Problems and Risks," in
Li Pang-kwong (ed) Political Order and Power Transition in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese
University Press, 1997), pp 159-186.
147 Lau and Kuan called the Hong Kong Chinese "attentive spectators." See n 145 above.
148 The Basic Law expressly protects Hong Kong citizens' freedoms of association, of assembly, of procession,
and of demonstration. Similar protection can be found under Article 21 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights made applicable to Hong Kong via Article 39 of the Basic Law.
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field in 2003 at the First of July Rally to challenge the enactment of Article
23 legislation still caught everyone by surprise. Tung's poor governance
had rejuvenated the political quest of the civil society of Hong Kong, a quest
which it might have suppressed since 1989. Even the more privileged sectors
in civil society joined hands with the others in the First of July Rally in
2003.
The widespread participation of the civil society was unexpected by all
players, including even the civil society itself. No matter what had caused so
many people to express their dissatisfaction against the HKSAR Govern-
ment in such a symbolic manner, the First of July Rally is a landmark in the
history of social movement in Hong Kong, indicating how a widespread
people's movement could achieve significant change in major government
policies.14
The significance of the emergence of this new player to the constitu-
tional game will be further analysed in this article, but the entrance of the
civil society into the playing field has at least disturbed the equilibrium of
the game and every other player (maybe except the CFA, at least at that
moment) must readjust their constitutional positions to accommodate the
changing political and constitutional environment in the "post-First-of-July-
Rally" era.
Besides these two major changes, there were also some less significant
changes in the players. Under the Principal Officials' Accountability System
(POAS) introduced by Tung in July 2002,150 all principal officials were no
longer civil servants. The term of office was set for five years and will not
exceed that of the Chief Executive who nominates them. Principal officials
are accountable to the Chief Executive, meaning that the Chief Executive
may terminate their contracts at any time. The civil servants, who originally
led the bureaus, were re-titled to become the permanent secretaries of the
bureaus and are now under the authority of the principal officials. They are
responsible for assisting the principal officials in formulating, implementing,
and marketing policies under their assigned portfolios. Some outsiders joined
the team, but there were also some senior civil servants who, after a change to
their status, stayed in office.
Originally, there was not much difference between the principal officials
and the civil service. However, this change in the form of principal officials
has caused some new players who have great potential to interact with other
149 Joseph Y.S. Cheng (ed), The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event (Hong Kong: City Uni-
versity of Hong Kong Press, 2005).
150 Tung had already provided some hints in his Policy Address in 2000 and in his Policy Address in
2001. See also the Address by Tung on 17 April 2002 at LegCo and the Code for Principal Officials
under the Accountability System (G.N. 3845, 28 June 2002).
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players to join the game and the influence of senior civil servants is also much
reduced.'
Another change Tung made was to reform the Executive Council. Tung
appointed the chairpersons of two major political parties in LegCo, the
Democratic Alliance on the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), the major
political party representing the pro-Beijing camp, and the Liberal Party,
the major political party representing the business camp, to be members of
the Executive Council. Tung believed that this could form a ruling coalition
and would ensure support from LegCo on government bills and policies.
When Tsang took over, he introduced another major change to the
Executive Council. He added more non-official members into the Executive
Council. Principal officials other than the Chief Secretary for Administra-
tion, the Financial Secretary, and the Secretary for Justice are not required to
attend the meeting of the Executive Council unless their policy portfolios are
part of the agenda of the meeting.
(b) Basic Law as the Rules of the Constitutional game of Hong Kong
As stated at the beginning of this article, the Basic Law has been viewed
as a constitution. However, the status and nature of the Basic Law as a con-
stitution in Hong Kong's constitutional game is not unanimously accepted.
In addition to being the constitution of Hong Kong, the Basic Law is also
considered to be "the brainchild of an international treaty, the Joint Declara-
tion,"152 and "maintains the common law and a common law judicial system.""'
However, whether the Basic Law should be understood as a constitution had
been raised at an early stage of the drafting of the Basic Law."' Another em-
phasis that the Basic Law is a "national law" of China"' may affect its status
in regulating players' behaviour in the game.
151 Immediately after the introduction of the new system, there was concern that this was not really an
accountability system, as the principal officials are only accountable to the Chief Executive but not
to the Hong Kong citizens. There is no mechanism for Hong Kong people or their representatives to
remove incapable principal officials or principal officials who have committed wrongdoings. To many
people, the POAS was only a mechanism for Tung to cleanse the executive authorities of the HKSAR,
ensuring that his policies would be supported wholeheartedly by all officials. Not long after its launch,
the POAS system suffered a serious blow. In January 2003, Antony Leung, the Financial Secretary,
was found to have purchased a vehicle shortly before his announcement of the increase in the first
registration tax of motor vehicles. The serious criticism from the public and the media that Leung's
conflict of interest generated in this incident only resulted in a letter of reprimand to Leung from
Tung. The establishment and the enforcement of the POAS all depended on the will of the Chief
Executive himself.
152 HKSAR v Ma Wai-kwan David & Others [1997] HKLRD 761 at p 772, per Chan CJHC.
153 Lau Kong-yung and 16 others v Director of Immigration [199913 HKLRD 778, at p 820, per Sir Anthony
Mason.
154 Zhang Youyu, "The Reasons for and Basic Principles in Formulating the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region Basic Law, and Its Essential Contents and Mode of Expression," (1988) 2 Journal of
Chinese Law 5, at p 7.
155 Lau Kong-yung, n 153 above, p 821.
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 542 2007
Vol 37 Part 2 The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong 543
As a result, on some occasions, some rules other than the Basic Law have
been referred to as the rules of the game for Hong Kong's constitutional game"'
and this adds more complication to the already complex situations caused by
the inherent indeterminacy of the Basic Law. Sometimes, it is not too clear
whether the Basic Law or some other rules should be referred to in determin-
ing the rules of the game."
Several approaches of interpretation have been suggested by the players.15
The first player to use an interpretation approach was the CFA. The CFA in
the landmark decision concerning migrant children from mainland China
which is also the first Basic Law case it considered, Ng Ka Ling and Others v
Director of Immigration,159 established the purposive approach as the approach
of interpreting the Basic Law. In essence, the purposive approach is a form of
textualist approach as mentioned in Bobbit's list of legal approaches.
The CFA described the purposive approach in the following terms: . in
resolving the gaps and ambiguities of the constitution, the court is bound to
give effect to the principles and purposes declared in the constitution by
resorting to the purposive approach in interpreting the provision in question.
The true meaning of the instrument (constitution) is to be ascertained from
relevant provisions, the language of its text in light of the context as well as
relevant extrinsic materials." 160
However, in a later case also concerning migrant children from main-
land China,161 the CFA refined its approach of interpretation and called the
156 The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Motion Proposed
by Mr Zheng Yaotang and 31 Other Deputies to the National People's Congress adopted by the
Ninth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on 31 August
1994 and the Resolution of the Eighth National People's Congress at its Fifth Session on the Work
Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
National People's Congress adopted by the Eighth National People's Congress at its Fifth Session on
14 March 1997 had been referred to as the legal basis for the establishment of the Provisional LegCo.
157 In determining the constitutionality of provisions in the National Flag and National Emblem Ord-
inance, it is not clear whether the Basic Law or the Law of the PRC on the National Flag should be
the final authority. The Law of the PRC on the National Flag was enacted by the NPCSC at the 14th
Session of the Seventh NPCSC on 28 June 1990 and was made applicable to the HKSAR through
the Decision of the Standing Committee of the NPC on the Addition and Deletion of National Laws
listed in Annex III of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC adopted at the 26th Session of the
Eighth NPCSC on 1 July 1997 in accordance with Art 18 of the Basic Law. The CFA in HKSAR v Ng
Kung-Siu and Lee Kin-Yun (FACC 4/1999) avoided this issue in making its ruling in the case. See also
the analysis in Benny Y.T. Tai, "Chapter One of Hong Kong's New Constitution: Constitutional
Positioning and Repositioning" in Ming Chan and Alvin Y. So (eds) Crisis and Transformation of
China's Hong Kong (M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
158 For a detailed analysis of the approaches of the interpretation by the players, see Peter S.C. Chau,
Sally P.L. Ho, Connie H.Y. Lee and Benny Y.T Tai, "Seeing the Evolution of Constitutional Inter-
pretation in Hong Kong through the Grids Model," a paper presented in the Interpretations and
Beyond Conference organised by the Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Uni-
versity of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 25-26 November 2005.
159 See n 1, at p 339.
160 See n 1, at p 340.
161 The Director of Immigration v Master Chong Fung Yuen (FACV No 26 of 2000).
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new approach, the common law approach. The major difference between the
common law approach and the purposive approach is that in certain circum-
stances, the court would base its interpretation more on the language of the
specific provision in question and does not need to refer to the wider textual
context and extrinsic materials. 16 2 Therefore, like the purposive approach,
the common law approach is also a form of textual approach, though a
narrower one.
Another approach of interpretation that has been considered by players
in Hong Kong's constitutional game is the historical approach in Bobbitt's
list, more often referred to as the originalist approach. After the decisions of
the CFA in Ng Ka Ling, Tung made a report to the CPG to seek for assistance
from the CPG to deal with the unbearable pressure on the HKSAR from the
effect of the CFA's interpretation. Tung asked the State Council to make a
request to the NPCSC to interpret the relevant provisions of the Basic Law.
The main ground Tung put forward was that the CFA's interpretation of the
relevant provisions of the Basic Law is different from the HKSAR
Government's understanding of the "wording, purpose and legislative intent
of these provisions."163 It seems that the major difference between the CFA
and Tung is their understanding of the "legislative intent" of the Basic Law.
Though Tung did not suggest any alternative approach of interpretation
explicitly, it is likely that he preferred the historical approach.
The NPCSC in its first interpretation on the Basic Law 16 4 upon this
request from Tung also did not advance any other method of interpretation
or question the purposive approach adopted by the CFA, but it did refer to
"the legislative intent" of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law that can be
162 The CFA stated in the case that: "The courts' role under the common law in interpreting the Basic
Law is to construe the language used in the text of the instrument in order to ascertain the legislative
intent as expressed in the language. Their task is not to ascertain the intent of the lawmaker on its
own. Their duty is to ascertain what was meant by the language used and to give effect to the legisla-
tive intent as expressed in the language. It is the text of the enactment which is the law and it is
regarded as important both that the law should be certain and that it should be ascertainable by the
citizen. The courts do not look at the language of the article in question in isolation. The language is
considered in the light of its context and purpose. See Ng Ka Ling at 28-29. The exercise of interpre-
tation requires the courts to identify the meaning borne by the language when considered in the light
of its context and purpose. This is an objective exercise. Whilst the courts must avoid a literal,
technical, narrow or rigid approach, they cannot give the language a meaning which the language
cannot bear.
Once the courts conclude that the meaning of the language of the text when construed in the
light of its context and purpose is clear, the courts are bound to give effect to the clear meaning of the
language. The courts will not on the basis of any extrinsic materials depart from that clear meaning
and give the language a meaning which the language cannot bear."
163 Report on Seeking Assistance from the Central People's Government in Solving Problems Encoun-
tered in the Implementation of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, 20 May 1999.
164 Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Art 22(4) and
para 3 of 24(2) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region adopted by the
Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress at its 10th Session on 26 June 1999.
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found in a document outside the Basic Law.165 The NPCSC ruled that the
interpretation of the CFA "is not consistent with the legislative intent" of
the Basic Law.166
There is no additional information on the NPCSC's approach of inter-
pretation"' from its second interpretation on the Basic Law.168 In its third
interpretation, it seems that the NPCSC has applied both the textual approach
and the historical approach in resolving the conflict on the length of the
term of office of the re-elected Chief Executive after Tung's resignation.169
(c) Winning Goals of the Players in the Constitutional game of Hong Kong
As the winning goals of the players in a constitutional game are determined
by their constitutional positions, these positions in Hong Kong's constitu-
tional game are examined here.
The constitutional position adopted by the Beijing Government is one of
an open-minded sovereign. This originates from Beijing Government's policy
of unification, "One Country Two Systems". From that position, the winning
goals of the Beijing Government are fourfold. First, the Beijing Government
wants to maintain its sovereign status in Hong Kong by ensuring that no
player can pose any substantive challenge against its sovereignty over Hong
Kong. The maintenance of stability and economic prosperity in Hong Kong
is its second goal. Third, it needs to convince the international community
that Hong Kong can continue to practice a high degree of autonomy in
deciding its internal affairs. Fourth, the Beijing Government also wants to
use the Hong Kong model to convince the people of Taiwan to agree to unify
with the Mainland.
Tung as the First Chief Executive of the HKSAR viewed himself as a
Chinese Official from Hong Kong and a conservative reformer. These two
165 Opinions on the Implementation of Art 24(2) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region of the People's Republic of China adopted at the 4th Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory
Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the National People's Congress on
10 Aug 1996.
166 See the Explanatory Note on the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress of Arts 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of The People's Republic of China presented at the 10th Session of the Standing Committee
of the 9th National People's Congress on 22 June 1999 by Qiao Xiaoyang, the Deputy Secretary of
the Legislative Affairs Commission, NPCSC.
167 Some critics view the interpretations by the NPCSC in both the first and the second interpretation
as not really interpretation but legislative decisions. In China's constitutional system, it is not easy
to distinguish interpretation and legislation in the NPCSC's power of legislative interpretation pro-
vided by Art 67(4) of the Constitution of the PRC and Art 42 to 47 of the Law on Legislation of the
People's Republic of China. See Chau, Ho, Lee and Tai, n 158 above.
168 Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Clause 7 of Annex
I and Clause 3 of Annex 1I of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
adopted by the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress at its 8th Session on
6 Apr 2004.
169 Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Art 53(2) of the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region adopted at the 15th Session of
the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress on 27 Apr 2005.
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constitutional positions reek with ironies. The first constitutional position is
concerned with the relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong and the
second position is related to the internal administration of Hong Kong.
Tung's winning goal was to gain the trust and support of both the Beijing
Government and Hong Kong people. If there were to be a conflict between
Beijing and Hong Kong, it would be difficult for Tung to make a choice.170
Therefore, an accompanying goal was to avoid any possible conflict between
Beijing and Hong Kong. The winning goal from Tung's second constitutional
position was to reform Hong Kong's social systems without changing them in
ways that may affect vested interests too much.
After Tung failed miserably in most of his goals, Tsang took up the office of
the Chief Executive. What winning goals Tsang and all other would-be Chief
Executive of the HKSAR can have are limited by the institutional context.
At least at this stage, a Chief Executive needs the blessing of the Beijing
Government before he can be elected. This made Tsang's primary winning
goal to earn the trust of the Beijing Government especially while he served
the remaining term of Tung and because he did not have a track record of a
close relationship with officials in the CPG.
Like Tung, Tsang also wants to be trusted by Hong Kong people. On inter-
nal policies, Tsang wanted to restore strong governance.171 Also, he wants the
HKSAR Government to play a more limited role and the market a more
prominent role in governance.172
The Executive Council and the principal officials as institutional entities
do not have any winning goals different from the Chief Executive as their
constitutional positions are advisors and assistants to the Chief Executive
respectively. However, some individual members of the Executive Council or
some individual principal officials may want to make use of their positions
to enhance their chance to succeed Tsang to be the Chief Executive of the
HKSAR in the following term, as Tsang has provided an example of career
advancement for senior members in the HKSAR Government.
In the civil service, only the administrative officers (the most prestigious
rank of civil servants) can have any constitutional status. Again, their role is
to assist the Chief Executive in implementing his policies. During the colon-
ial rule, administrative officers did not merely implement policies, they were
also policy makers. The wining goal of administrative officers at that time was
to administer Hong Kong in the public interest according to their under-
standing of public interest. There was no change during the first term of Tung's
rule. However, after Tung introduced the POAS, administrative officers could
170 If there were to be a conflict, Tung at the end might see himself more a loyal agent of the Beijing
Government rather than a representative of Hong Kong.
171 Policy Address of the Chief Executive 2005-2006, paras 5-10.
172 Policy Address of the Chief Executive 2006-2007, para 68.
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only be assistants to the principal officials and they lost any substantial con-
stitutional position as well as any winning goal in the constitutional game.
Tsang, with a civil service background, found it much easier to work with
civil servants. Among the 15 principal officials nominated by Tsang for the
third term of the HKSAR Government, nine are from the civil service. How-
ever, these appointments are political as they are no longer civil servants.
Therefore for those senior civil servants who remain in the civil service, they
do not have any substantial constitutional position and winning goal except
that they may try their best to attract the attention of Tsang through their
loyal and effective service in the hope that Tsang will nominate them when
there are vacancies for principal officials. Whether the future Chief Execu-
tive will be like Tsang, favouring civil servants in his choice of principal
officials, is not clear. The significance of administrative officers in the civil
service as a player of Hong Kong's constitutional game remains to be seen.
The three camps in the LegCo all have their constitutional positions. The
pro-democracy camp, knowing that it is still a minority in LegCo, set its
constitutional position to be the opposition. However, it also sees itself as a
democratic reformer to the current unfair political system. Its winning goals
are to put an effective check on the administration and to have an early
implementation of geographical direct elections for both the Chief Executive
and LegCo. For internal social policies, the pro-democracy camp is divided,
with members ranging from the far left to the centre-right.
The pro-Beijing camp's constitutional position is the supporter of the
Beijing Government in Hong Kong and therefore it must also be the supporter
of the Chief Executive who has the backing of the Beijing Government.
Its major winning goal is to see the Beijing Government and the HKSAR
Government both being supported by Hong Kong people.
However, there may be tension between this constitutional position and
its other position as a potential ruling party. The winning goal of the latter
constitutional position is to cultivate as much support from the general pub-
lic of Hong Kong as possible because it needs their votes in elections. In some
cases, it may need to join hands with the pro-democracy camp to criticise the
HKSAR Government, though at critical issues and moments it will be called
back to act out its role as the supporter of the HKSAR Government.
The business camp's representation in LegCo is institutionally guaranteed
through the functional constituency system in LegCo. 17 1 For decades, the
173 Simon Young and Anthony Law, "Privileged to vote: inequalities and anomalies of the FC system" in
C. Loh and Civic Exchange (eds), Functional Constituencies: A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council (Hong Kong; Hong Kong University Press, 2006) 59-109 and Simon Young, "Elected
by the elite: functional constituency legislators and elections" in C. Loh and Civic Exchange (eds),
Functional Constituencies: A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (Hong Kong; Hong
Kong University Press, 2006) 111-142.
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policies of the colonial government and the HKSAR Government have been
in favour of a free market, ie minimal governmental intervention in the
market. Therefore, the business camp's constitutional position is a preserver
of the status quo with the winning goal of maintaining the present form
of political system as long as possible and discouraging the HKSAR Govern-
ment from changing its "Big Market, Small Government" policy. Gaining
more influence in LegCo by winning some seats through geographical elec-
tion and in the Executive Council by joining the ruling coalition is consistent
with its constitutional position.
Ironically, political groups represented in LegCo all have their constitu-
tional positions but LegCo is prevented from having a constitutional position
as an entity itself by the institutional design in the Basic Law. The different
election methods of the members of LegCo ensure that the interests repre-
sented in LegCo are diverse and successfully prevents the formation of a
majority party.1 4 As no political party represented in LegCo could control
the majority, the political parties have to cooperate before they can find a
constitutional position for LegCo, but such cooperation can seldom be
achieved because of the intense conflict between the camps. As a result, LegCo
does not have the capacity to position itself in any significant way other than
as a weak or feeble overseer of the HKSAR Government.
Those who have studied constitutional courts in new constitutional
systems will not be surprised by the constitutional position taken by the CFA."'
When it had the first opportunity to spell out its constitutional position in
detail in Ng Ka Ling, the CFA positioned itself as the guardian of Hong Kong's
high degree of autonomy, the guardian of Hong Kong's rule of law and the
guardian of human rights in Hong Kong."'
The primary winning goal of the CFA was to have the judicial autonomy
of Hong Kong courts established, and judicial independence maintained in
the new constitutional game. The other winning goals like the establishment
of Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, the maintenance of Hong Kong's
rule of law, and the protection of human rights of Hong Kong people could
then be achieved through this primary goal.
Civil society, by nature, is very different from the other players in the
constitutional game. Civil society is not a single entity but is composed of
hundreds of thousands of free associations of citizens outside the direct con-
trol of the state. These associations may have a tightly organised structure or
174 Different sectors elect their own representatives into LegCo through the functional constituencies
election. A proportional representation system is adopted in the geographical direct election which
allows small political parties to more easily win a seat in the election.
175 Epstein, Knight, and Shevetsova, n 63 above, Ginsburg, n 63 above, and Shannon Ishiyama Smith-
ery and John Ishiyama, "Judicial Activism in Post-Communist Politics," (2002) 36 Law and Society
Review pp 719-741.
176 Tai, n 157 above.
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they may be very loose. The relationship with members in these associations
can be relatively permanent or it can be just temporary, even incidental. The
associations can be very large in size with thousands of members or they can
be very small. The objectives of the associations can be political, professional,
social, religious, economic, ideological, cultural or racial, or any of the other
concerns that cause a group of people to join together. Their relationship
with the government also varies from institutional, instrumental or cooperat-
ive to confrontational.
The heterogeneity of civil society makes any analysis on the constitu-
tional role it can play in a constitutional game extremely difficult. There is no
one association, or even group of associations, in the civil society of Hong
Kong, unlike the Catholic Church and Solidarity in Communist Poland, which
could mobilise the people to join together to challenge the rulers. Therefore,
there is no clear constitutional position one can identify for the civil society.
However, at the same time, one cannot ignore its presence in the game and
what constitutional position it may suddenly take up at critical moments in
the game. This adds a lot of game play uncertainty.
(d) Game Resources of the Players in the Constitutional game of Hong Kong
Again, we must start with the Beijing Government as it has the most resources
in the game, to such an extent that one may question whether any meaning-
ful constitutional game can be played if it actually uses all its resources.
The power to enact"' and amend"' the Basic Law belongs to the Beijing
Government. It is also responsible for the defence"' and foreign affairs"o of
the HKSAR. The Beijing Government further retains the power to review
local legislation,"' the power to apply national laws to the HKSAR in
limited situations,182 and the power to appoint the Chief Executive1 83 and the
principal officials.18 1
Though the Basic Law has set limits or conditions for the Beijing Govern-
ment to exercise these powers, it has the power to interpret the Basic Law
which may be the most important and convenient power enjoyed by the
Beijing Government in the game."s' Through interpreting the legal text that
describes the conditions for exercising the above-mentioned powers, there is
almost nothing the Beijing Government cannot do. In other words, any con-
stitutional limits are self-imposed.
177 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Art 31.
178 Basic Law, Art 159.
179 Basic Law, Art 14.
180 Basic Law, Art 13.
181 Basic Law, Art 17.
182 Basic Law, Art 18.
183 Basic Law, Arts 15 and 45.
184 Basic Law, Arts 15 and 48(5).
185 Constitution of the PRC, Art 67(4) and Art 158 of the Basic Law.
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Another very important power of the Beijing Government in the game is
its power to determine who will be the Chief Executive. The election method
of the Chief Executive ensures that no person without the support of the
Beijing Government can be elected.186 As the Chief Executive must be a
person it can trust and the office of Chief Executive is vested with immense
power to administer the internal affairs of Hong Kong by the Basic Law, the
Beijing Government can also indirectly decide internal affairs in Hong Kong
through the Chief Executive if it desires.
One additional power that the Beijing Government has established for
itself is that it has control over the whole process involving any change to the
election methods of the Chief Executive and LegCo" and the HKSAR does
not have the power to deicide by itself to introduce any change to the polit-
ical system of the HKSAR. This is consistent with the emphasis by Wu
Bangguo, Chairman of the NPCSC, in an important speech recently deliv-
ered in a seminar marking the 10th anniversary of the Basic Law, that the
HKSAR does not enjoy residual powers and can only have the powers given
by the Beijing Government."'
An executive-led form of government has been used to describe the
nature of the political system of the HKSAR'8 meaning that governmental
powers are mainly vested in the HKSAR Government which, in turn, is cen-
trally led by the Chief Executive.
The Basic Law provides a long list of powers of the Chief Executive in-
cluding the power to implement laws, to sign bills passed by LegCo and to
promulgate laws, to sign budgets passed by LegCo, to decide on government
policies and to issue executive orders, to appoint or remove judges of the
courts at all levels in accordance with legal procedures, to appoint or remove
holders of public office in accordance with legal procedures, to implement
the directives issued by the CPG, to approve the introduction of motions
regarding revenues or expenditure to LegCo, to decide whether government
officials should testify or give evidence before LegCo or its committees, to
pardon persons convicted of criminal offences or commute their penalties, to
handle petitions and complaints,190 and to dissolve LegCo.191
186 Basic Law, Art 45 and Annex I.
187 In the Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Clause 7 of
Annex I and Clause 3 of Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
adopted by the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress at its 8th Session on 6
Apr 2004, the NPCSC states that no amendment to the provisions in the two Annexes can be made
without a report to the NPCSC by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR on whether there is a need to
make an amendment and the NPCSC makes a determination. The bills on the amendments after
being passed by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the LegCo and the consent of the Chief
Executive shall be reported to the NPCSC for approval or for the record.
188 See also Art 20 of the Basic Law.
189 Wu Bangguo in the same speech re-emphasised that the principle of an executive-led form of govern-
ment is the most important characteristic of the HKSAR's political structure.
190 Basic Law, Art 48.
191 Basic Law, Arts 49-52 and 70.
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In addition to these express powers, through the interpretation by the
NPCSC, the Chief Executive also has the power to ask the NPCSC to inter-
pret any provision of the Basic Law by making a report to the CPG.1 2 However,
the Chief Executive cannot use the power to issue executive orders to limit
fundamental rights enjoyed by Hong Kong people. 193
Compared with the HKSAR Government, LegCo has substantially lesser
powers and its powers may be even more limited than LegCo during the colon-
ial rule. LegCo has the power to make the HKSAR Government accountable
but it can only require the HKSAR Government to implement laws passed by
LegCo; to present regular policy addresses to LegCo; to answer questions raised
by members of the LegCo; and to obtain approval from LegCo for taxation
and public expenditure."I It has the power to impeach the Chief Executive
for serious breach of law or dereliction of duty' which is a power it did not
have under the colonial rule but individual members of LegCo have consid-
erably more limitations in introducing 96 and passing bills' than during the
colonial time.
There are two controversial powers enjoyed by LegCo. One is to summon
persons to testify or give evidence before LegCo'19 and the other is to pass a
non-legal binding motion on no confidence in government officials. There is
a question as to whether a select committee set up by LegCo to inquire into
policy failures of government officials can summon the Chief Executive to
give evidence.'
There is no express provision that allows or prohibits a motion of no
confidence but it is argued that such a power is inconsistent with the prin-
ciple of an executive-led form of government.
The Basic Law does not expressly state the powers of courts of the HKSAR
other than providing that the courts of the HKSAR "shall have jurisdiction
over all cases in the Region, except that the restrictions on their jurisdiction
192 See the Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Art 22(4)
and para 3 of 24(2) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region adopted by
the Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress at its 10th Session on 26 June 1999.
193 The CFA in Koo Sze Yiu and Leung Kwok Hung v Chief Executive of the HKSAR (FACV Nos 12 & 13
of 2006) ruled that an executive order cannot satisfy the requirement of "in accordance with legal
procedures."
194 Basic Law, Art 64 and 79.
195 Basic Law, Art 79(9).
196 Article 74 of the Basic Law provides that bills which do not relate to public expenditure or political
structure or the operation of the government may be introduced individually or jointly by members
of the LegCo. The written consent of the Chief Executive shall be required before bills relating to
government polices are introduced.
197 Basic Law, Annex II, Part II.
198 Basic Law, Art 79(10) and Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, Cap 382, s 9.
199 Article 48(11) gives the Chief Executive the power to decide, in the light of security and vital public
interests, whether government officials or other personnel in charge of government affairs should
testify or give evidence before LegCo or its committees but it is not clear whether he can also exempt
himself. In the inquiry into the handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) out-
break by the HKSAR Government and the Hospital Authority, Tung avoided the problem by meeting
with the select committee but not giving evidence before the committee.
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imposed by the legal system and principles previously in force in Hong Kong
shall be maintained."
Two powers exercised by the courts of the HKSAR have been questioned.
The first one is the power to review the constitutionality of statutes enacted
by LegCo and the power to review the legality of administrative actions.
Though there is no express provision in the Basic Law that authorises the
courts of the HKSAR to have the power of constitutional review 200 and judi-
cial review of administrative actions,201 from the structure of the Basic Law
the courts of HKSAR no doubt have these powers.
The CFA confirmed that the courts of the HKSAR have both powers in
Ng Ka Ling.202 What is controversial is that the CFA included in its power of
constitutional review the power to review whether the legislative acts of the
NPC or the NPCSC are consistent with the Basic Law and to declare them to
be invalid if found to be inconsistent. 203 After the CFA issued a subsequent
clarification on this ruling, it seems that the courts of the HKSAR will not
exercise this extended form of constitutional review power in the future.
In several recent cases, the courts of the HKSAR have provided new rem-
edies like remedial reading20 and suspension order of unconstitutionality.206
The courts of the HKSAR have also opened the possibility to conduct
an abstract review of constitutionality07 and provide new constitutional
200 Article 11 of the Basic Law provides that no law enacted by the legislature of the HKSAR shall
contravene the Basic Law. The only constitutional review mechanism expressly provided in the
Basic Law is provided in Art 17 to be exercised by the NPCSC. However, the NPCSC will only
review laws enacted by LegCo if they contravene the provisions of the Basic Law regarding affairs
within the responsibility of the Central Authorities or regarding the relationship between the Cen-
tral Authorities and the HKSAR. There is no provision on which institution will review laws enacted
by LegCo that contravene provisions of the Basic Law other than those provisions stated in Art 17.
The only institution in the HKSAR that could exercise this power is the courts. Also, Art 19 pro-
vides that the courts of the HKSAR shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except that
the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles previously in force in
Hong Kong shall be maintained. As courts of Hong Kong during the colonial rule had the power of
constitutional review (see Winfat Enterprise (HK) Co Ltd v Attorney General [1988] 1 HKLR 5), there-
fore, the courts of the HKSAR should also have this power.
201 Article 35 provides that Hong Kong residents shall have the right to institute legal proceedings in
the courts against the acts of the executive authorities and their personnel. If the courts of the HKSAR
have no power to review acts of the executive authorities and their personnel, then it will produce an
absurd result in that the residents have the right to sue the HKSAR Government in the courts but
the courts have no power to hear the case or give remedies. In addition, the power to review admin-
istrative actions is well embedded in common law principles. As the common law will be maintained
in the HKSAR (see Arts 8 and 18 of the Basic Law) and the courts of the HKSAR can refer to
precedents of other common law jurisdictions (Art 84 of the Basic Law), the courts of the HKSAR
can also find the origin of their power to review administrative actions in the common law.
202 Ng Ka Ling, see n 1 above, at p 3 3 7.
203 Ibid.
204 NgKa Lingv Director of Immigration (No 2) [1999] 1 HKLRD 577.
205 HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai and the other (FACC No 4 of 2005).
206 Koo Sze Yiu and Leung Kwok Hung v Chief Executive of the HKSAR (FACV Nos 12 & 13 of 2006).
207 In Leung TC William Roy v Secretary forJustice (CACV 317/2005), the Court of Appeal ruled that the
courts of the HKSAR on a case by case basis may determine whether sufficiently exceptional circum-
stances exist to enable it to exercise the discretion to hear cases concerning constitutionality of
statutes notwithstanding that future conduct or a hypothetical situation is involved.
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remedies like prospective overruling" and temporary validity order of
unconstitutionality.209
Civil society does not have any direct institutional power but the civil
society can have four main non-institutional powers to influence constitu-
tional decision making in the game. The first power is to initiate constitutional
review or judicial review proceeding to challenge the constitutionality of leg-
islation or administrative actions. 210 The second power is to participate actively
in public discussion on public policies in the media. The third power is to
conduct opinion polls on public policy issues or performance of the HKSAR
Government and its officials. The fourth power is to organise and participate
in large-scale public demonstrations like the First of July Rally.
(e) Game Actions in Hong Kong's Constitutional Game
Many actions have been taken by the players in the last 10 years in Hong
Kong's constitutional game and it is impossible to include them all in this
study - it will only illustrate several major actions taken by the players in this
part; specifically self-initiated actions. Reactions to the actions of the other
players will be covered in the following section, on interaction. However,
sometimes it is not easy to distinguish whether an action is actually a self-
initiated action or a reaction.
The most important action of the Beijing Government was not to take
any action after it had successfully laid the constitutional foundation for
the HKSAR through the enactment of the Basic Law, the preparation for the
transitional arrangements,"21 and the setting up of the basic governance
structure in the HKSAR. The design of the governance of the HKSAR with
a trustworthy Chief Executive vested with overwhelming powers to manage
Hong Kong on behalf of the Beijing Government would not require the Beijing
Government to play any active role in the governance of Hong Kong accord-
ing to its original thinking. Therefore, many actions taken by the Beijing
Government were actually reactions to actions taken by players in Hong Kong
including sending four Mainland legal experts to Hong Kong to express
concern over a controversial judgment by the CFA, exercising the power to
208 HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa and the Other (FACC No 1 of 2006).
209 Koo Sze Yiu, n 206 above.
210 The Chief Justice of the CFA in his speech at the Ceremonial Opening of the Legal Year 2006
accepted that this is one of the reasons to explain the rising numbers of judicial review applications.
(See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200601/09/P200601090137.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007).)
211 The Beijing Government failed to come an agreement with the British Government on the compo-
sition of the last LegCo during the colonial rule and the original transitional arrangement for the last
LegCo to be the first LegCo of the HKSAR provided in the Method for the Formation of the First
Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China adopted by the 7th NPC at its 3rd Session on 4 April 1990 could not
be carried out. The Beijing Government decided that a provisional LegCo had to be set up to fill the
legal vacuum. See n 156 above.
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interpret the Basic Law upon requests by the Chief Executive, settling the
political instability in Hong Kong caused by Tung's poor governance and re-
storing its control over the pace of Hong Kong's democratic development.
When Tung first took up his position as the Chief Executive, he had many
new plans for the betterment of Hong Kong. However, many such plans were
either abandoned without giving notice to the public or failed miserably. He
put the blame on the non-cooperation of senior members of the civil service.
Before the introduction of the POAS, most of the principal officials were
civil servants.212 As Tung had no prior experience in running a government,
he relied heavily on the civil servants to assist him in implementing his pol-
icies. However, he soon found that some senior officials within the HKSAR
Government did not share his view on how the HKSAR Government should
position itself in the new constitutional game.
Tung introduced the POAS to reassert his authority in the HKSAR
Government. The provisions in the Basic Law provided sufficient room
for Tung to introduce such a fundamental change to Hong Kong's political
system without amending the Basic Law. 14
Another proactive move taken by Tung to reassert his authority was the
decision to go ahead with the legislative plan to enact Article 23 of the Basic
Law after five years of inaction.215 Article 23 provides that: "The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act
of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Gov-
ernment, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or
bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit
political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with
foreign political organizations or bodies."
212 The only exception was the then Secretary for Justice, Leung Oi Sie. She was a solicitor in private
practice and a member of the Hong Kong Deputies to the NPC before her appointment. She was not
the first Attorney General (the name of the post of the Secretary for Justice during the colonial rule)
who was recruited from outside the civil service. Another exception was Antony Leung who was
appointed to be the Financial Secretary in 2001.
213 The premature retirement of the Chief Secretary for Administration, Anson Chan, raised serious
suspicion about conflict between the Chief Secretary for Administration and the First Chief Exe-
cutive. The last public speech given by Anson Chan in her capacity as the Chief Secretary for
Administration gave a lot of hints on this internal tension within the HKSAR Government. (See
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200104/19/0419138.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007).) Since 2004,
Anson Chan has been very active in local politics and often put forward very critical comments
against the HKSAR Government. With her insider knowledge, her views are very influential, and in
some cases, damaging to the HKSAR Government.
214 Article 61 of the Basic Law lists the qualifications of principal officials but it does not include the
requirement of being a civil servant.
215 Tung might be under the pressure from the Beijing Government to initiate the legislation for the
HKSAR. After waiting for 5 years, the Beijing Government might be reluctant to wait any longer.
See the view of Qiao Xiaoyang, the Deputy Secretary of the Legislative Affairs Commission, NPCSC,
reported in Wenweipo, 27 Sept 2002.
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Tung believed that the HKSAR Government had a constitutional duty to
enact laws to implement the requirements of Article 23.16 A consultation
paper was issued in September 2002.217 There might not be much dispute on
whether there was such a constitutional duty as it is expressly stated in the
Basic Law that the HKSAR "shall enact laws on its own," but the form, the
scope, and the timing of the fulfilment of this duty were questioned by many.
The Basic Law does not provide any other guidelines on legislation apart
from than the general requirements as stated in Article 23 itself.
The consultation paper had adopted a rather expansive reading of the
legislative requirements for fulfilling the constitutional duty of Article 23. A
series of new offences and old offences to be redefined were suggested, includ-
ing treason, secession, sedition and subversion. There could be definitions
that might be less intrusive to individual rights, but the HKSAR Govern-
ment chose to provide only the lowest level of protection to Hong Kong
citizens' fundamental rights, as opposed to the protection of national security.
Many proposals were not directly related with Article 23.2" The scope of the
Official Secrets Ordinance was proposed to be extended to criminalise more
acts than just theft of state secrets as required by Article 23. Affiliation with
illegal Mainland organisations by local organisations was also covered, though
Article 23 only requires the prohibition of political organisations or bodies
of the HKSAR from establishing ties with foreign political organisations or
bodies. Wide investigative powers were suggested to be granted to the police
in dealing with the offences under Article 23. It seemed that the HKSAR
Government had tried to address some unspoken concerns of the Beijing
Government, even if these concerns might not be directly covered by
Article 23.
The HKSAR Government released the results of the consultation in a
Compendium of Submissions, 219 showing that the majority supported legisla-
tion to implement Article 23. However, it was criticised that the approach of
the HKSAR Government in categorising and processing the submissions was
biased.220 There was also a strong opinion in the society asking for a white bill
on the national security legislation so that there could be more detailed dis-
cussion in the community on the actual wording of all the offences before the
216 For the analysis of this constitutional duty, see Benny Y.T. Tai, "The Principle of Minimum Legisla-
tion for Implementing Article 23 of the Basic Law" (2002) 32 Hong Kong Law Journal pp 579 -614.
217 Consultation Document on Proposals to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law. Available at http://
www.basiclaw23.gov.hk/english/download/reporte.pdf (last visited 4 Aug 2007).
218 Tai, n 216 above.
219 Available at http://www.basiclaw23.gov.hk/english/download/forward-e.pdf (last visited 4 Aug 2007).
220 See "Doing Justice to Public Opinion in Public Consultations: What to Do and What NOT to Do -
A Case Study of the Government's Consultation Exercise On its Proposals to Implement Article 23
of the Basic Law," a report by the Research Team on the Compendium of Submissions on Article 23
of the Basic Law, 26 May 2003. Available at http://hkupop.hku.hk/Chinese/resources/bl23/bl23gp/
report/report.pdf (last visited 4 Aug 2007).
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bill went to LegCo. However, the HKSAR Government refused. It seemed
that there was a deadline for the HKSAR Government to complete this
legislation, though it was not clear whether the deadline was self-imposed or
set by the Beijing Government. For the reactions to this controversial action
taken by Tung, see the discussion on the Article 23 game in the following
Section.
Though institutionally LegCo did not have a very distinct role in Hong
Kong's constitutional game other than endorsing the proposals from the
HKSAR Government or putting up some weak or feeble opposition against
the HKSAR Government, some actions were still taken by LegCo in utilising
its limited resources in the game.
According to Article 74 of the Basic Law, bills which do not relate to
public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the government
may be introduced individually or jointly by members of LegCo. The written
consent of the Chief Executive shall be required before bills relating to govern-
ment polices are introduced.
However, it is not clear on whether it should be the President of LegCo
or the Chief Executive who determines whether a bill is related to public
expenditure or political structure or the operation of the government, and
whether a bill is related to government policies. In designing its rules of
procedures, 221 LegCo tried to extend its power by vesting this power to the
President of LegCo.222
LegCo had debated a motion on no confidence in a principal official though
the motion did not have any legal or constitutional effect. 223 It had also three
times exercised the power to conduct public inquiries on governance failures.
One very important action taken by the CFA in its first case on the Basic
Law was to assert its constitutional jurisdiction. This had caused chain reac-
tions from other players and these interactions will be further examined in
the following part. What is interesting is that the action of CFA is not
unusual for a constitutional court in its early days.225
221 Basic Law, Art 75.
222 Rules of Procedures of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR, Rules 51 and 57.
223 See the Motion on no confidence in the Secretary for Justice moved by Margaret Ng in March 1999.
(http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/counmtg/hansard/9903 10fc.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007).)
224 See the Report of the Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances lead-
ing to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of the new Hong Kong
International Airport at Chek Lap Kok since 6 July 1998 and related issues, July 1998 (http://
www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/sc/scOl/papers/report.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007)); the First
Report of the Select Committee on Building Problems of Public Housing Units, Jan 2003 (http://
www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/sc/scbldg/reports/rptl.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007)); the
Second Report of the Select Committee on Building Problems of Public Housing Units, May 2004
(http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/sc/sc-bldg/reports/rpt_2.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007)); and
the Report of the Select Committee to inquire into the handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome outbreak by the Government and the Hospital Authority, July 2004 (http://
www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/sc/scsars/reports/sars-rpt.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007)).
225 See n 175 above.
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The civil society unexpectedly was very active in the game, especially
after 2003. Several major constitutional revieW226 and judicial review actions2 7
were initiated by the civil society as part of its social or political movement
against constitutional or legal decisions of the HKSAR Government.
Since 2003, the First of July Rally has become an annual event for the
civil society of Hong Kong to present their various demands to the HKSAR
Government and the Beijing Government which include the introduction of
geographical direct election for the election of the Chief Executive and all
members of LegCo.
(f) Playing Fields in Hong Kong's Constitutional Game
During the last 10 years, some playing fields of Hong Kong's constitutional
game were expected but some were not. Gamesmanship in the government
offices of the HKSAR Government, the chamber of the LegCo and the court
rooms were expected but the gamesmanship in the NPCSC and the streets
were not.
226 In Ng Kung-Siu, n 157 above, the two accused were alleged to have damaged a national flag and a
regional flag contravening s 7 of the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance, Cap 1557, and
s 7 of the Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance, Cap 1558. They could have put up a
defence that they were only displaying a desecrated national flag and regional flag but they wanted to
challenge the constitutionality of the provisions by relying on Art 19 of the ICCPR and Art 39 of
the Basic Law. In Leung Kwok-hung and others v HKSAR (FACC Nos 1 and 2 of 2005), one of the
accused, Leung Kwok-hung, was a member of LegCo and a social activist. He organised a procession
but refused to comply with the statutory notification procedures under the Public Order Ordinance,
Cap 245. Leung believed that the statutory notification procedures contravene Art 27 of the Basic
Law, Art 20 of the ICCPR, and Art 39 of the Basic Law protecting the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly of Hong Kong citizens. He was charged with committing offences under the Public Order
Ordinance and he put forward these constitutional provisions as his defence in the case. Leung was
also involved in another case, Koo Sze Yiu and Leung Kwok Hung v Chief Executive of the HKSAR
(FACV Nos 12 & 13 of 2006). He alleged that as a political activist, he might have been a target of
covert surveillance and he started this action to challenge the constitutionality of an executive order
made by the Chief Executive that authorised covert surveillance by law enforcement agencies of the
HKSAR Government.
227 In Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Limited (FACV 14/2003), the legality of
the draft Outline Zoning Plan proposed by the Town Planning Board authorising the reclamation in
the Harbour along the Wan Chai Harbour Front was challenged by the Society for Protection of the
Harbour for contravening s 3 of the Protection of Harbour Ordinance. Section 3 provides that the
harbour is to be protected and preserved as a special public asset and a natural heritage of Hong Kong
people, and for that purpose there shall be a presumption against reclamation in the harbour. All
public officers and public bodies shall have regard to this principle for guidance in the exercise of any
powers vested in them. The CFA in deciding that "the presumption must be interpreted in such a
way that it can only be rebutted by establishing an overriding public need for reclamation" relied on
an analogy from constitutional limitation on rights enjoyed by citizens on the basis that there is a
clear legislative intent to accord a unique legal status to the harbour. In Ho Choi Wan v Housing
Authority (FACV 1/2005), the majority of the CFA resolved the legal disputes purely on the basis of
its interpretation of the legal text of the Housing Ordinance, Cap 283, in a challenge against the
decision of the Housing Authority not to reduce the rent paid by tenants in public housing estates
and to conduct a review of the rent. However, the minority judge, Bokhary PJ, referred to the right to
affordable housing protected by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
to support the legal claims of the tenants.
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Even though the Basic Law expressly provides that the NPCSC is vested
with the power to interpret the Basic Law,28 it was expected that this power
would not actually be used, at least not so early and not so frequently.
In 1999, the NPCSC first exercised its power to interpret the Basic Law to
resolve the constitutional disputes on the right of abode of emigrant children
from mainland China upon the request of the Chief Executive. The second
time was self-initiated by the NPCSC in 2004 and resolved the constitu-
tional controversies for the introduction of geographical direct election to
the election of the Chief Executive in 2007 and election of all members of
LegCo in 2008. The third time was also made upon a request from the Chief
Executive to resolve the constitutional controversy on the length of the term
of office of a re-elected Chief Executive.
In its first interpretation, the NPCSC's interpretation was not very much
like an action taken in a playing field in a constitutional game since not
much reasoning on legality was put forward to legitimise the interpretation
other than by just referring to the legal authority of the NPCSC to interpret
and to determine what should be the legislative intent. In the second and
third interpretations, more legal reasoning was provided to legitimise the de-
cisions and they might be hardly recognisable as decisions made in a playing
field in a constitutional game. However, the legitimacy relied upon was still
mainly legal legitimacy and there was insufficient concern about the socio-
logical and moral legitimacy of those decisions.
The streets may not be unexpected as a playing field as Hong Kong people
had already developed a tradition of voicing out their concerns in public dem-
onstrations even before the transfer of sovereignty. What is unexpected is the
scale of involvement from the civil society in Hong Kong in these rallies
since the First of July Rally in 2003. Though not all claims put forward in the
rallies were constitutional decisions, the streets still qualified as a playing field
in Hong Kong's constitutional game as many claims raised by the civil society
were phrased in legal and constitutional terms. Also, the degree of participa-
tion by the civil society in these rallies can at least be seen an indicator of the
level of sociological legitimacy in many constitutional controversies engen-
dered by the actions and reactions taken by other players in Hong Kong's
constitutional game.
(g) Interactions in Hong Kong's Constitutional Game
This article will now look at the most interesting part of the constitutional
game. It has already looked at how the different players searched for their
constitutional positions, developed constitutional powers and took actions
within the boundaries set by the Basic Law. They tried to utilise the room
228 Basic Law, Art 158.
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provided by the Basic Law as far as possible to maximise their chances of
achieving their winning goals. However, some of the actions taken by indi-
vidual players threatened the winning goals of the other players and they
responded to the initial actions which resulted in chain reactions in the
constitutional game. In the last 10 years, there were two main rounds of inter-
actions. The first round was the "right of abode game" and the second was the
"Article 23 game".
The immediate action that triggered the reactions was the decisions of the
CFA in Ng Ka Ling.229 However, if the incidents are traced back, it might
actually be the enactment of the amendments to the Immigration Ordinance
by the Provisional LegCo on the basis of the legislative proposals put forward
by the HKSAR Government to take away or limit the right of abode of
migrant children from mainland China and the constitutional review actions
initiated by the parents of these children to challenge the constitutionality of
the legislation.
The CFA had issued two key rulings in this case. One concerned the con-
stitutional jurisdiction of the courts of the HKSAR and the other concerned
the substantial merits of the case.
As stated above, the CFA in asserting its constitutional jurisdiction ex-
tended its power of constitutional review to reassess whether the legislative
acts of the NPC or the NPCSC are consistent with the Basic Law. This ruling
triggered a reaction from the Beijing Government. However, the Beijing
Government did not use its formal constitutional power. It just sent four
Mainland legal experts to Hong Kong to question the decisions of the CFA.
The HKSAR Government also responded by seeking clarification from the
CFA on this part of the judgment.
The reason for such a reaction from the Beijing Government was that the
decision of the CFA went against its conception of "One Country Two
Systems" and threatened the sovereign status of the NPC and NPCSC. How-
ever, as the HKSAR was still in its early days, the Beijing Government did
not want to disturb the systems in Hong Kong. As a result, it restrained from
using its formal power to interpret the Basic Law to override the decisions of
the CFA. Rather it only used a less direct power by criticising the judgments
of the CFA through an informal or semi-official channel. By relying on the
opinions of legal experts who had been involved in the drafting of the Basic
Law, the Beijing Government still wanted to set the tune of the criticism as
legal rather than political.
The reason for HKSAR Government's reaction was to coordinate with
the moves of the Beijing Government. Though there was no precedent for
229 This decision was decided together with another decision that concern the right of abode of
emigrant children from mainland China, Chan Kam Nga and others v Director of Immigration [1999] 1
HKLRD 304.
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the HKSAR to seek for clarification from the judiciary after a final judgment
is delivered and for the courts of the HKSAR to clarify its own final judg-
ment, as the nature of the issues had already been set as legal, both the HKSAR
and the CFA accepted that the best method to settle the controversy would
also be through legal proceedings.
Whether the CFA had really changed its decisions was no longer significant;
the cooperative gesture of willingness to clarify its judgment indicated that
the CFA accepted that it had acted beyond the legitimate scope of actions in
Hong Kong's constitutional game. This controversy could have had a more
damaging result if the Beijing Government had used the formal power of
interpretation to override CFA decisions or the CFA had refused to clarify its
judgment on the request of the HKSAR Government. After this interaction
with the Beijing Government, the CFA realised that its understanding of the
constitutional jurisdiction of the courts of the HKSAR could not be proper
and knew that as regional courts under the constitutional system of the whole
of China, the courts of the HKSAR are under more constitutional limita-
tions than it had perceived, even though the CFA is said to have the power of
final adjudication under the Basic Law.
In later cases concerning the Basic Law, the CFA did not have to recon-
sider this constitutional issue on whether the courts of the HKSAR have
the power to review the compatibility of legislative acts of the NPC and the
NPCSC with the Basic Law. Even if it had to, it is unlikely that the CFA
would make the same decision as in Ng Ka Ling.
The second key ruling by the CFA in Ng Ka Ling also caused reactions
from both the HKSAR Government and the Beijing Government, however
the central role this time was played by the HKSAR Government and the
Beijing Government only acted to coordinate with the reaction of the HKSAR
Government.
Seeing that the decisions of the CFA would impose unbearable pressure to
the HKSAR, Tung in his capacity as Chief Executive made a report to the
CPG and requested assistance from the Beijing Government. The NPCSC
was asked to interpret the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and such
interpretation was issued.
The HKSAR government had exaggerated the possible outcome of the
CFA's decision in Ng Ka Ling to justify its reaction to involve the Beijing
Government to resolve a purely local issue. Even the Beijing Government
had avoided using its formal power to directly challenge the authority of the
courts of the HKSAR, but in this case the HKSAR Government had invited
the Beijing Government to use its power of interpretation to override the
CFA's judgment. The HKSAR Government did not appear to realise how
damaging it would be on Hong Kong's rule of law and judicial autonomy.
The problem of this reaction by the HKSAR Government in utilising this
extraordinary power provided by the Basic Law to deal with an issue that
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 560 2007
The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong 561
could have been dealt with by other means is that it had set a bad precedent
that the power of interpreting the Basic Law could be used for convenience
rather than as a last resort.
In a constitutional game, careful interpretation of the constitution is
fundamental but the use of the power of interpretation by the NPCSC in this
way seriously tilted the balance totally to one side. It increases the danger
that the constitutional game of Hong Kong will deteriorate into just a purely
political game.
The courts of the HKSAR were put in a difficult position by this act of the
HKSAR Government. After this, the CFA had to adjudicate under a poten-
tial threat that its decisions might trigger another interpretation by the NPCSC
and would be overruled again. Some decisions were clearly made with such
self-restraint by the CFA.230 However, the CFA also had demonstrated that it
had acquired the skills to resolve controversial constitutional disputes by
wisely exercising its power to interpret the Basic Law, 23 1 to decide the con-
crete issues in the cases,232 and to grant appropriate constitutional remedies.
Fortunately, the HKSAR Government had also learnt some lessons from
this incident and since Ng Ka Ling the HKSAR Government had not sought
another interpretation from the NPCSC to overrule a decision by the CFA.
When Wong Yan Lung was appointed to be the new Secretary for Justice in
2005, he promised that he would try his best to avoid another interpretation
by the NPCSC though he did not promise that there would never be another
interpretation by the NPCSC.234
As stated above, legislation to implement Article 23 was one of the pro-
active moves of Tung to rebuild his authority in the HKSAR. The proposals
reflected the attitude of the HKSAR Government and its reading of the pro-
vision of the Basic Law. Insufficient attention was paid to the sensitive nature
of these legislative proposals in the political and social contexts of Hong Kong
and China. These so-called "crimes against the state" have been used by the
230 See the decision of the CFA in Ng Kung-Siu, n 157 above, and the analysis in Tai, n 157 above.
231 See the decision of the CFA in Chong Fung Yuen, n 161 above, refining its approach of interpretation
of the Basic Law. See the analysis in Benny Y.T. Tai, "The Judiciary," in Wai-man Lam, Percy Luen-
tim Lui, Wilson Wai-ho Wong and Ian Holliday (eds) Hong Kong Government and Politics: Governance
in the Post 1997 Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), p 70.
232 See the decisions of the CFA in Ng Siu-tung and Others v HKSAR [2002] 1 HKLRD 561 and the
analysis in Benny Y.T. Tai, "Ng Siu Tung and Others v Director of Immigration" (2002) 1 The Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law pp 147-151, Benny Y.T. Tai and Kevin Yam, "The advent
of substantive legitimate expectations in Hong Kong: two competing visions" [2002] Public Law
pp 688-702 and Tai, n 231 above, pp 70-71. See also the decision of the CFA in Leung Kwok Hung,
n 227 above.
233 See decisions of the CFA in Hung Chan Wa, n 208 above, Koo Sze Yiu, n 206 above, Lam Kwong Wai,
n 205 above, Leung Kwok Hung, n 227 above and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Leung T.C.
William, n 207 above, concerning the granting of new constitutional remedies.
234 See a speech by Wong Yan Lung entitled "One Country, Two Systems" given on 9 June 2006
at Chatham House, London. Available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200606/09/
P200606080140.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007).
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Beijing Government to suppress opposition in the Mainland. There was seri-
ous concern among Hong Kong people that these new criminal offences, if
enacted, might be manipulated to achieve a similar purpose in Hong Kong.
The other matters that had caused unnecessary controversy were the per-
formance of responsible officials, especially Regina Ip, the then Secretary for
Security, and some procedural decisions taken during the consultation and
legislative processes. There was a three-month consultation period. However,
Tung and Ip did not give the public an impression that they were serious
about listening to the opinions of the Hong Kong people.235
LegCo started its scrutiny of the National Security (Legislative Provisions)
Bill in February 2003. The HKSAR Government did make some clarifications
and concessions in the bill, but the stance of the government towards three
major concerns of the public was still unyielding. They included: (1) the
provision regarding the proscription of a local organisation subordinate to a
Mainland organisation which has been proscribed by the Central Authorities
on national security grounds; (2) a "public interest" defence for unlawful dis-
closure of certain official information; and (3) the provision which confers to
the police the power to search without a court warrant in the exercise of their
emergency investigation powers.
With the support from the ruling coalition, Tung believed that opposition
in LegCo could be easily smoothened out. The legislative schedule was not
disturbed by the outbreak of SARS, and Tung still demonstrated great
confidence that the legislative plan could be completed before the end of the
session of LegCo in July 2003.
Tung did not notice that the grievances of Hong Kong people against him
and the HKSAR Government had already accumulated to such a degree that
they were at the verge of erupting.236
On 1 July 2003, more than half a million Hong Kong people protested in
the streets. There might have been many causes to account for the people's
dissatisfaction with the HKSAR Government since the handover. The poor
economy, the lack of accountability of the POAS, the poor performance of
the officials during the SARS period, the unpopular image of Regina Ip in
forcing the Article 23 legislation through LegCo, the undemocratic nature
of the HKSAR Government, and the incompetence of Tung in handling all
these problems were all causes. However, there is no doubt that Article 23
235 See Carole Peterson, "National Security Offences and Civil Liberties in Hong Kong: A Critique of
the Government's 'Consultation' on Article 23 of the Basic Law," (2002) 32 Hong Kong Law Journal
pp 4 5 7-470.
236 For a detailed account of the Art 23 saga, see Carole Peterson, "Hong Kong's Spring of Discontent:
The Rise and Fall of the National Security Bill in 2003", in Fu, Peterson and Young (eds), National
Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong's Article 23 under Scrutiny (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2005), pp 13-62.
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 562 2007
The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong 563
triggered a deep-seated fear in the hearts of Hong Kong people that the Beijing
Government may take away their much treasured freedom via the hands of
the HKSAR Government. The civil society reacted in an unexpected way to
the proactive move of Tung.
The First of July Rally started a series of chain reactions from other play-
ers. The first response came from the Liberal Party. As it could not fully
ascertain the significance of the First of July Rally, the Liberal Party decided
to withdraw its support of the enactment of the Article 23 legislation if
the HKSAR Government insisted on enactment according to the scheduled
deadline. Without the votes from the Liberal Party in the LegCo, Tung had
no choice but to postpone and later withdraw the enactment. Another result
was the resignation of Regina Ip and Antony Leung not long after the First of
July Rally, though both claimed that their resignations were unrelated to any
accountability issue. It was speculated that the HKSAR Government need to
pacify the anti-government sentiment through the resignations of unpopular
officials.
The pro-democracy camp took up this opportunity to step up their de-
mands for further democratic development in Hong Kong. More and more
people started to question why Hong Kong people only have limited and
indirect methods to select their political leaders under the Basic Law. More
Hong Kong people started to question the legitimacy of the rule of the HKSAR
Government in its present form. They questioned why Tung could continue
to stay in office with such poor performance. Institutionally, Hong Kong people
did not have any power to remove him from office. It was generally recognised
that there must be fundamental changes to the selection methods of the Chief
Executive and the members of LegCo before the HKSAR Government could
regain its legitimacy in the Hong Kong people's hearts. The demand for fur-
ther democratic development in Hong Kong was growing ever stronger.
According to the Basic Law, there is a possibility that the third Chief
Executive and all members of LegCo will be directly elected in 2007 and
2008, respectively. Article 45 of the Basic Law provides that: "The method
for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual
situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accord-
ance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is
the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination
by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with demo-
cratic procedures. The specific method for selecting the Chief Executive is
prescribed in Annex I: 'Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region'."
Annex I of the Basic Law provides that: "If there is a need to amend the
method for selecting the Chief Executives for the terms subsequent to the
year 2007, such amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-
thirds majority of all the members of the LegCo and the consent of the Chief
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Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress for approval."
Article 68 of the Basic Law provides that: "The method for forming the
LegCo shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual
and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of
the LegCo by universal suffrage. The specific method for forming the LegCo
and its procedures for voting on bills and motions are prescribed in Annex
II: 'Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures'."
Annex II of the Basic Law provides that: "With regard to the method for
forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and its procedures for voting on bills and motions after 2007, if there
is a need to amend the provisions of this Annex, such amendments must be
made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members
of the Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be
reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for
the record."
Reading all these provisions together, many people in Hong Kong be-
lieved that 10 years after the establishment of the HKSAR, Hong Kong people
would have already had the power to decide by themselves on whether direct
election should be introduced as the method of election of the Chief Exe-
cutive and all the members of LegCo. "I The HKSAR Government was under
pressure to present a time table to review the political system so that direct
elections could be introduced in 2007/2008.
For a long time, the Beijing Government has had reservations against
allowing Hong Kong to develop democratically. The Beijing Government
was worried that the introduction of democratic reform may affect the vested
interests of the business people in Hong Kong who have long been loyal sup-
porters of the Beijing Government and are considered to be the pillars of
Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. Also, it may encourage the demand for
democratic reform in the Mainland, which may threaten the rule of the
Chinese Communist Party. The Beijing Government had to respond to that
237 In Explanations on "The Basic Law of the HKSAR (Draft)", Ji Pengfei, Chairman of the Drafting
Committee for the Basic Law to the National People's Congress, said that, "In the ten years between
1997 and 2007, the Chief Executive will be elected by a broadly representative election committee.
If there is need to amend this method of election after that period, such amendments must be made
with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the LegCo and the consent of
the Chief Executive, and they must be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress for approval ... Ten years after the establishment of the Special Administrative Region, if
there is a need to improve the method for forming the Legislative Council and its procedures for
voting on bills and motions, such improvements shall be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds
majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and
they must be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record."
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growing demand for democratic reform in Hong Kong and several critical
moves were made.
First, Tung was informed that the decision on the timetable for public
consultation and review on constitutional development could not be made
by the HKSAR Government even though the Secretary for Constitutional
Affairs had already promised the Panel on Constitutional Affairs of LegCo
that such a decision would be made before the end of 2003.238 This move was
to call a halt to any planned action of the HKSAR Government.
The second move involved four Mainland legal experts who were called
to assist by suggesting that the understanding of whether "there is a need" to
amend the method of selecting the Chief Executive or the forming of LegCo
must be determined by the Beijing Government.
To coordinate with the Beijing Government's move, Tung in his policy
address on 7 January 2004 announced the establishment of the Constitu-
tional Development Task Force. It was headed by the then Chief Secretary
for Administration, Donald Tsang, and the other members were the Secre-
tary for Justice and the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs. The Task Force
was to examine the relevant principles and legislative process in the Basic
Law relating to constitutional development in depth, to consult the relevant
departments of the Central Authorities, and to listen to the views of the
public on the relevant issues.
To justify the stance that the Beijing Government has the power to decide
on whether "there is a need", the previous ambiguous understanding of "One
Country Two Systems" had to be elucidated. Again, through the Mainland
legal experts, the understanding of "One Country Two Systems" to be "One
Country as the premise and foundation of Two Systems" was publicised.2 39
The next move was to use the pro-Beijing media to start a wave of patrio-
tism debate. Referring to a statement made by Deng Xiao-ping in 1984,24o it
should be the patriots who form the main body of administrators of the
HKSAR. A patriot was defined to be one who respects the Chinese nation,
sincerely supports the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong,
and wishes not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. This move was
238 See the statement of the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs in a meeting of the Panel on Constitu-
tional Affairs of the Legislative Council held on 17 Nov 2003. The minutes of the meeting are
available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ca/minutes/caO31117.pdf (last visited
4 Aug 2007).
239 Xia Yong, the Director of the Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Science is one of the four
Mainland legal experts. He published an articled entitled "'One Country' is the premise and founda-
tion of 'Two Systems"' on 22 Feb 2004 through the official Xinhua News Agency. This article quickly
became the official line of the Beijing government. Hu Jintao, President of the PRC, in the speech
marking the swearing in of the third term HKSAR Government on 1 July 2007 formally adopted this
stance on "One Country Two Systems."
240 "One Country, Two Systems" in Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of DengXiaoping: Volume 1II (1982-
1992).
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made in order to discredit some of the political leaders in the pro-democracy
camp in Hong Kong so as to question the legitimacy of their claims for direct
election in 2007/2008.
All these acts still needed a critical move that could trump any challenge
from Hong Kong. On 6 April 2004, the NPCSC issued an interpretation 241
making it clear that the procedure for making any amendment to Annex I
and II can take effect only if the Chief Executive makes a report to the NPCSC
regarding whether or not there is a need to make an amendment; and the
NPCSC shall, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 45 and 68 of the
Basic Law of the HKSAR, make a determination in the light of the actual
situation in the HKSAR and in accordance with the principle of gradual and
orderly progress. The bills shall be introduced by the Government of the
HKSAR into LegCo.242 This interpretation consolidated all the gains from
the quick and overwhelming moves by the Beijing Government in the con-
stitutional game. The other players could just pass. To many people, this
interpretation can hardly be called an interpretation. It looked more like an
enactment or decision.
Then, again to coordinate with the Beijing Government's move, Tung
made a report shortly after the Interpretation and recommended that there
was a need to amend Annexes I and II.243The Task Force also issued a report
recommending that direct elections should not be introduced in 2007/2008.244
This paved the way for the NPCSC to deliver the final blow to direct election
in 2007/2008. A decision was made by the NPCSC on 26 April 2004 that the
Chief Executive and all members of LegCo would not be directly elected by
Hong Kong citizens in 2007/2008.245 Nothing was mentioned about what will
happen after 2008.
With the power to interpret the Basic Law, the most powerful resource in
this constitutional game, the Beijing Government, can do almost anything it
likes and all the other players can hardly put up any effective resistance, not
241 See n 168 above.
242 Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Clause 7 of Annex
I and Clause 3 of Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China adopted by the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Con-
gress at its 8th Session on 6 Apr 2004.
243 The Report on whether there is a need to amend the methods for selecting the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2007 and for forming the Legislative Council of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2008. Available at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/cd/
eng/executive/pdf/cereport.pdf (last visited 4 Aug 2007).
244 The Second Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force: Issues of Principle in the Basic
Law Relating to Constitutional Development. Available at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/cd/eng/report2/
index.htm (last visited 4 Aug 2007).
245 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on issues relating to the
methods for selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the
year 2007 and for forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
in the year 2008 adopted by the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress at its
9th Session on 26 Apr 2004.
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even the civil society of Hong Kong. All legal arguments for direct elections
in 2007/2008 were just brushed aside to clear the way for the final outcome
that the Beijing Government desired to see. Within five months, the Beijing
Government had dashed any hopes of Hong Kong people to have direct elec-
tions in the near future that might have been aroused after the 1 of July Rally.
There were also some "soft" moves. Taking a political dream away from
the Hong Kong people was compensated for by economic gains. The Beijing
Government hoped that the introduction of CEPA 1 6 and the Individual Visit
Scheme24 7 would boost the economy of Hong Kong. It still believed that the
greatest grievance of Hong Kong people was economic but not political.
It is not clear whether the resignation of Tung in early 2005 and the re-
placement by Tsang as the Chief Executive were within this series of moves
of the Beijing Government in reacting to the Article 23 incidents.21
(h) Strategies of the Players in Hong Kong's Constitutional Game
Game strategy is developed by a player to maximise their chances to achieve
their winning goals. A player utilises their game resources in a playing field
according to a strategy that they have developed from their original percep-
tion of the possible actions and reactions of the other players. When other
players act in a way different from their original forecast, the original strategy
will have to be refined, changed or even abandoned and replaced by a new
strategy. After actions and reactions taken by the players in Hong Kong's
constitutional game, all players need to readjust their strategies.
If the original strategy of the Beijing Government is described as "One
Country as premises and foundation of Two Systems in its passive voice", the
new strategy adopted by the Beijing Government after the First of July Rally
in 2003 can be described as "One Country as the premise and foundation of
Two Systems in the active voice".
Since the handover, the strategy of the Beijing Government was not to
directly interfere in the local affairs of Hong Kong. It has already reserved
sufficient powers in the Basic Law and all it needed was to ensure that the
Chief Executive was a trustworthy and competent person to manage affairs in
Hong Kong on its behalf. To add an extra guarantee, the Beijing Govern-
ment has also built a pro-government ruling coalition including the pro-Beijing
246 CEPA stands for Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between Hong Kong and the Chinese
Mainland. It is a free trade agreement under WTO rules and gives preferential access to the Main-
land market for Hong Kong companies and professionals. It was launched on 1 Jan 2004.
247 The scheme allows citizens from selected cities in mainland China to visit Hong Kong on an indi-
vidual basis. In the past, Mainland people could only visit Hong Kong using business visas or in group
tours.
248 See the analysis in Benny Y.T. Tai, "A Tale of the Unexpected; Tung's Resignation and the Ensuing
Constitutional Controversy," (2005) 35 Hong Kong Law Journal pp 7-16.
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camp and the business camp in Hong Kong to support the rule of the Chief
Executive.
The passive strategy is consistent with the constitutional position of the
Beijing Government as this would give the world an image of an open-minded
sovereign. Hong Kong could enjoy a high degree of autonomy to decide its
own affairs. Even though it is very clear that the Beijing Government always
considers that the proper understanding of "One Country Two Systems" must
be "One Country" having primacy over "Two Systems", it had never expli-
citly stated this point.
However, the failure of Tung and the HKSAR Government to enact the
legislation on implementing Article 23 caused the Beijing Government to
realise that it would lose control over the development in Hong Kong if it
continued to rely on its current strategy and the existing ruling mechanism in
the HKSAR.
From the subsequent development of the First of July Rally, the Beijing
Government discovered that on the one hand, Tung, though trustworthy, did
not have the ability to lead the HKSAR Government effectively. On the
other hand, the Liberal Party was not a very trustworthy partner, especially at
critical moments.
A new strategy was needed. The Beijing Government had to reassert its
authority within Hong Kong in a more direct and active manner. We have
seen how the moves taken by the Beijing Government under the new stra-
tegy have achieved its objectives cleanly and clearly.
It may be that the Beijing Government has adopted this active applica-
tion of "One Country Two Systems" to make it possible for it to resume a
more passive position later. By removing any hope for direct elections in 2007/
2008, the pressure upon the HKSAR Government was relieved. The Beijing
Government hoped that the HKSAR Government could refocus its efforts
towards reinvigorating the economy of Hong Kong.
This may also show a pattern of the Beijing Government's strategy in deal-
ing with Hong Kong's affairs. A "hard" move must be accompanied by some
following soft moves to balance the negative impact. However, one may also
see that all the moves of the Beijing Government share the same objective
which is to maintain stability and prosperity in Hong Kong. What strategies
and moves are needed to achieve the objective may change over time and as
the socio-political environment in Hong Kong changes. During a period of
time, passivity might be the appropriate strategy but during another period, a
hard line might be needed. At still another period, a soft approach will serve
the purpose better.
From the consequences, the Beijing Government may see that a more
active strategy in dealing with Hong Kong internal affairs is proper because
it can successfully remove all factors of instability, at least on the surface.
There is no guarantee that the Beijing Government will not adopt this active
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strategy again in the near future when it sees that there is a need. However,
what it thinks to be a need may not be considered as one by the people in
Hong Kong.
This is a unique feature of the constitutional game of Hong Kong. It is an
unbalanced game in the sense that one player dominates the game. As the
dominant player, the Beijing Government sets the rules of the game, giving it
the most favourable position and maximum room to direct the flow of the
game. It also has the most powerful game resources in the whole game, i.e. the
power to interpret the Basic Law.
However, even with this almost unlimited power, there are practical con-
cerns that the Beijing Government cannot ignore. If it still wants to set a
constitutional game in Hong Kong and not just a purely political game, it
must be constrained by the rules it had set.
In the incidents in which the Beijing Government took active moves,
these were done through an issuance of an interpretation on relevant articles
of the Basic Law by the NPCSC, together with other hard and soft moves
to coordinate with this decisive move. The text of the Basic Law can be
manipulated by the NPCSC to give meanings that conform to the objective
of the Beijing Government's overall strategy. Though the Beijing Govern-
ment has the power to give any interpretation, the actual interpretation given
must be justified and legitimised by existing rules. The kind of legislative
interpretation by the NPCSC is alien to Hong Kong's common law system,
and the intrusion into legal interpretation using purely political concerns
hurts Hong Kong's rule of law.
The active strategy must still be justified by using processes and reasoning
that are more in line with the general principles that are acceptable in Hong
Kong rather than just imposing the decision upon Hong Kong. Though the
performance may still not be up to the Hong Kong standard, this reflects that
the Beijing Government understands that this active strategy must only be
used with caution. In the long run, if the Beijing Government becomes more
active in its strategy, it will affect the degree of autonomy that Hong Kong
can actually enjoy. These adverse consequences of the active approach may
deter the Beijing Government from using the active strategy so casually.
Tung might not have had any concrete strategy at the beginning of his
term other than to act in accordance to what he deems best for Hong Kong.
However, when he encountered difficulties in governance, both internally
and externally, he changed his strategy by rebuilding a strong image for him-
self and the HKSAR Government. We have already seen the actions taken
by Tung to implement his new strategy but for a government that did not
enjoy much legitimacy, Tung's new strategy might have caused his own failure.
When Tsang took up Tung's position as the "new" Second Chief Exe-
cutive, he also needed to search for a new strategy to avoid the mistakes of
Tung. There is speculation that Tsang only got Beijing's blessing because of
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his civil service background and his popular support amongst Hong Kong
people.
The Beijing Government has three main sources of support in Hong Kong:
the pro-Beijing camp, the business camp and the civil service. Tung was a
businessman, but he failed to handle the complex political environment within
Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty. The pro-Beijing camp has no
experience in running a government. The only choice seems to be the civil
service.
The civil service was the ruling clique during the colonial times, and there
is no question of its ability in governance. However, there are reservations as
to whether civil servants can be trusted. One reason that the Beijing Govern-
ment insisted that the term of the new Chief Executive could only be the
remaining term of his predecessor and not a new term was that Tsang had to
be put on probation to test his trustworthiness.
Another reason may be that the Beijing Government had to pacify the
other pro-Beijing groups as they had already planned to send their represen-
tatives to run in the scheduled election for the Chief Executive in 2007.
Tsang may want to rebuild an image of a strong, efficient and effective
government but any strategy to be developed by Tsang must address these
background reasons for his rise to power. First, Tsang does not have the gen-
eral support that Tung had within the pro-Beijing camp and the business
camp. Second, Tsang's relationship with the Beijing Government is not as
close as Tung's. The Beijing Government's support is totally based on his
ability to rule Hong Kong effectively and to keep the development of Hong
Kong within the boundaries set by the Beijing Government. However, there
is one area in which Tsang is better than Tung; he continues to enjoy the
support of Hong Kong people. This may also be his main bargaining chip
with the Beijing Government.
Therefore, the primary strategy of Tsang must be to earn the trust of the
Beijing Government by demonstrating his loyalty and ability. In the last two
years, Tsang did convince the Beijing Government of his loyalty and ability.
He passed his probation and was elected to be the third Chief Executive.
During the next five years, Tsang will be on the same tightrope that every
Chief Executive will have to walk. Balancing "One Country" and "Two Sys-
tems" well is the skill that a Chief Executive must possess. Leaning too far on
either side will cause him to fall as Tung did.
The introduction of the POAS has introduced a group of accountable
officials to the HKSAR Government. Even if they are from the civil service,
their roles are different from both the era of colonial rule and the first term of
Tung. They are accountable to the Chief Executive. Events before and after
the First of July Rally make it clear that their accountability is substantial.
Though Hong Kong people have no institutional power to remove them and
Tung would have liked to shelter them from the intense public pressure, he
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was not successful in most of the cases. Even Tung himself could not stand
the public pressure from the media and civil society and had to resign. Princi-
pal officials are within the eye of any political typhoon and they must face the
storm. Unfortunately, each principal official has to face it by him or herself.
As illustrated above in the section concerning constitutional positions,
the principal officials, the Executive Council and the civil service do not
have any substantial constitutional positions and therefore they do not have
any concrete strategy.
The first batch of accountable principal officials came from different back-
grounds. Quite a number were from the civil service, the others were from the
business sector, the professional sector, and the academia. The only thing
that they have in common is that they were all willing to serve under Tung's
leadership - but their reasons might have been very different. It is clear that
there is no single policy vision that joins them, causing a lack of team men-
tality among the principal officials. As a result, whenever a principal official
faces criticisms and challenges in his/her own policy portfolio, he or she would
find himself or herself a lone fighter, hoping that other principal officials would
not stab them in the back.
Under the new term of office of Tsang, he has included more principal
officials with a civil service background. This may improve the past problem
of principal officials as lone fighters but it is still not clear what independent
roles could be played by principal officials and whether any strategy of their
own could be developed. However, individual principal officials may use the
coming five years to build up their personal reputations so as to enhance their
chances of succeeding Tsang as the fourth Chief Executive.
Members of the Executive Council, like the principal officials, all come
from different backgrounds, and there is no policy vision that joins them
together. The political parties in the ruling coalition had already indicated
their dissatisfaction; they could not have any significant input in policy mak-
ing as all policy portfolios are in the hands of the principal officials. Even if
they are members of the Executive Council, that privileged position very
often gives them more burden than benefit. They have to defend government
policies in LegCo and to the public and there may be policies that they do
not really support.
Under Tsang's new leadership, the ruling coalition is maintained. All cur-
rent non-official members remain in the Executive Council. It is not clear
whether the reform to be introduced by Tsang will change the Executive
Council such that it is more like a real cabinet or if it will continue to be an
advisory body. Up to now, the Executive Council as a player has no independ-
ent strategy, though each of its members may have his or her own agenda.
The role of civil servants, especially those from the administrative officers
rank, has changed substantially since the introduction of the POAS. They
are no longer policy makers and in theory they should be responsible only for
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the implementation of policies decided by the principal officials. However,
under the POAS system, they are also asked to fulfil the same political task as
the principal officials to lobby support from LegCo and answer questions from
the media and the public. The only difference between civil servants and
principal officials is that the former need not resign for policy failure.249 Tis
change of role has substantially affected the morale of civil servants. How far
this has affected the effectiveness of the HKSAR Government in governance
still requires further study.
The recent appointment of Tsang as the third Chief Executive may give
hope to some that the good old days of civil servants may return as Tsang
himself was also a civil servant. However, bygones are bygones; the golden
days of the Hong Kong civil service may never return. Unfortunately, it ap-
pears that the civil service does not have the capacity to formulate any coherent
strategy to adapt to the new chapter other than to simply finish their assign-
ments at hand.
The result of the election in 2004 did not change the nature of LegCo,
though there are now more members in the pro-democracy camp. As stated
above, under the existing institutional structure, LegCo does not have the capa-
city to position itself in any significant way other than putting up some form
of opposition against the Government. Until the time the pro-democracy
camp could form the majority of LegCo, LegCo cannot enforce an effective
check on policy making and implementation of the HKSAR Government.
It is likely that LegCo will continue to be divided into the three camps.
The DAB has made it clear that its ultimate aim is to become a ruling party.
Tsang's taking over of Tung's position makes it clear that the Beijing Govern-
ment may not believe that the DAB or the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong
have the legitimacy and ability to manage the complicated political environ-
ment of Hong Kong. Therefore, the DAB is in rather a dilemma. To adopt a
strategy which could help itself achieve its long-term goal may conflict with
its short-term duty to support the Tsang administration. Like all other play-
ers, it is walking on a tightrope. If the political system of Hong Kong develops
to become more democratic, even if the pace is going to be slow, the DAB
needs the votes of the Hong Kong people. Receiving only around 25 per cent
of the votes in the election in 2004, its road to becoming a ruling party is still
long. Its coming challenge is how to obtain votes by supporting the HKSAR
Government. Ironically, Tsang's growing support makes the DAB's stance easier
to justify to the public but may also further delay its dream of governing Hong
249 However, in the recent controversy concerning the Allegations relating to the Hong Kong Institute
of Education, the then Permanent Secretary for Education and Manpower, Fanny Law, resigned after
the Commission of Inquiry on Allegations relating to the Hong Kong Institute of Education found
that she was partly guilty of the charges, but Arthur Li, the Secretary for Education and Manpower,
could stay in office.
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Kong directly. The DAB has now adopted a strategy of maintaining the gen-
eral impression of being pro-government but it may also try to keep a certain
distance from the Tsang administration.
Business people are important to the governance of Hong Kong, but it
seems that after the failure of Tung, the Beijing Government considers busi-
ness people as a group of people who must be respected but cannot be trusted
with the direct authority to govern Hong Kong. The Liberal Party's unfaith-
ful track record has also put the Beijing Government on alert. The Liberal
Party cannot be excluded, but how far it can be trusted is a concern that
cannot easily be forgotten in the minds of the officials in Beijing. The Party's
main support comes from the functional constituencies in LegCo, though it
managed to get two seats from geographical direct election in 2004. Any
change in the functional constituencies will weaken its influence in LegCo.
Getting more votes in geographical direct elections must be its long-term
objective if it wants to maintain its share in LegCo. The Liberal Party is in a
similar dilemma as the DAB. It must strike a good balance between support-
ing and keeping a distance from Tsang's administration and it must also watch
closely the reaction of the Beijing Government.
As for the pro-democracy camp, the chance that they could get the major-
ity in LegCo in the coming years may still be rather remote. As the opposition
voice in LegCo, they find it more and more difficult to win public support by
opposing the HKSAR Government in light of Tsang's growing support. They
must be able to show to the public that they can be more than just a group of
oppositionists. They are also in a dilemma, though of a different nature from
that of the DAB and the Liberal Party.
To demonstrate their ability to govern, they must take up any chance to
show that they can maintain at least a working relationship with the Beijing
Government and that they can propose some sensible alternative policies.
Drawing themselves too close to the Beijing Government may affect their
support from the public, but failing to at least communicate with the Beijing
Government may cause them to lose votes. They must strike a balance, which
is not easy to ascertain; they are also rather passive in this matter as the Beijing
Government holds the key to the door of communication.
Internally, the pro-democracy camp includes political parties, political
groups, and individuals of very different backgrounds. They differ quite widely
in social policies and the only thing that joins them together is the same
aspiration for democratic development in Hong Kong. It is very difficult for
the pro-democracy camp to establish a joint policy platform. Also, as they are
still in the minority and lack experience in governance, their substantial so-
cial policy proposals do not enjoy the same level of legitimacy as their demands
for democracy or other institutional concerns. The HKSAR Government
does not need to pay much attention to their concrete policy proposals, if
any.
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The CFA has made a substantial change to its strategy. If one called its
initial strategy aggressive as well as naive by trying to assert its constitutional
jurisdiction and positioning itself as the guardian of Hong Kong's rule of law,
autonomy and human rights, then its later strategies have become much more
pragmatic after its clashes with the Beijing Government and the HKSAR
Government in Ng Ka Ling. There were several aspects to the new strategies
adopted by the CFA.
First, after Ng Ka Ling, the CFA accepts the authority of the NPCSC to
interpret the Basic Law even outside the framework of Article 158 of the
Basic Law. Actually, the CFA does not have any choice. As the NPCSC is
the highest constitutional organ within the Chinese constitutional system to
interpret law and the HKSAR is an integral part of the Chinese constitu-
tional system, the courts of the HKSAR must submit to the authority of the
NPCSC. The CFA even agreed to revisit some of the constitutional prin-
ciples again to re-confirm the supreme constitutional authority within the
HKSAR enjoyed by the NPCSC. 250
Second, in the case that there is a possibility that its decision may invite
another interpretation from the NPCSC, the CFA will try to avoid the issue
and decide the case without touching on any sensitive provision in the Basic
Law.251
Third, the CFA reset its priority among the three guardianships. In order
to protect Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and human rights, the CFA
must first preserve its judicial independence and judicial authority. This
requires the maintenance of rule of law in Hong Kong. Therefore, the
guardianship of Hong Kong's rule of law must come before the other two
guardianships. As the greatest threat to rule of law in Hong Kong is perceived
to be another interpretation by the NPCSC, the CFA must try to avoid any
NPCSC interpretation even if this means paying the price of less human
rights protection in Hong Kong.252
Fourth, if the possibility of interpretation by the NPCSC is remote, the
CFA will still strive to fulfil its visions and decide the case accordingly. The
CFA has not given up its constitutional position as the guardian of human
rights if there is no conflict with its more important constitutional position as
the guardian of Hong Kong's rule of law. The CFA is not slow in developing
new legal principles and doctrines to provide more protection to Hong Kong
people's rights.
250 See the decision of the CFA in Lau Kong-yun, n 153 above and the analysis in Tai, n 157 above.
251 Seen 157 above. See also P.Y. Lo, "Rethinking Judicial Reference: Barricades at the Gateway," a paper
presented in the Interpretations and Beyond Conference organised by the Centre for Comparative
and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 25-26 Nov 2005.
252 See n 157 above.
253 See the decision of the CFA in Albert Cheng and Lam Yuk Wah v Tse Wai Chun [2000] 1 HKLRD A15
and the analysis in Tai, n 157 above.
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 574 2007
Vol 37 Part 2 The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong 575
Fifth, even in a case that may involve sensitive provisions of the Basic
Law, the CFA will still try to achieve a sense of justice according to its
understanding of the purposes of the Basic Law by developing some non-
constitutional legal principles.
Sixth, the CFA has developed better skills in balancing conflicting inter-
ests in constitutional disputes and can produce decisions that are considered
to be legitimate by both parties to the disputes including the losing party.255
Concerning the performance of the CFA after Ng Ka Ling, Chen com-
mented that it is "neither too proud nor too humble" in adjudicating
constitutional disputes. 256 Ghai to a certain extent agreed with this comment
as he sees that the CFA has "on the whole discharged its responsibility with
wisdom and distinction. "257
The active participation of civil society in 2003 was unexpected. The
Beijing Government's main reason for adopting a more active strategy in Hong
Kong affairs is the emergence of a much more politically-oriented civil soci-
ety after the First of July Rally. Many moves of the Beijing Government were
not only to reassert its institutional control over Hong Kong, but also to con-
vince the civil society to abandon its political orientation and revert back
to its traditionally more economic oriented mindset. The granting of CEPA
status to Hong Kong and the Individual Visit Scheme were such efforts.
Civil society, by nature, cannot be directed, only moulded. Each associa-
tion in the web of civil society has its own agenda and priority. The response
of each of the associations to the strategy of other parties in the constitu-
tional game is not static and will change over time. The sensitivity of each
association to the political situation and the strategies of other players may
254 In Ng Siu-tung, n 233 above, the CFA in facing the interpretation of the NPCSC barring giving any
constitutional remedy to emigrant children from mainland China innovatively imported an English
common law principle of substantive legitimate expectation to resolve similar disputes before the
court as in Ng Ka Ling. Though the majority of the applicants still could not establish their right of
abode, the new doctrine allowed a substantial number of applicants to have their right of abode
applications be reconsidered by the Director of Immigration in light of the applicants' legitimate
expectation that the Director had expressly promised to implement the decisions of the CFA in Ng
Ka Ling. What could not be done via the route of constitutional law, the CFA achieved partially via
the less politicised route of administrative law.
255 See the decision of the CFA in Leung Kwok-hung, n 227 above. Leung wanted to challenge the
constitutionality of the provisions of Public Order Ordinance concerning the power of the Commis-
sioner of Police to disallow public procession and the HKSAR Government wanted to prosecute
Leung Kwok-hung for breaching the requirements of the Public Order Ordinance. The CFA decided
that a certain provision of the Public Order Ordinance was unconstitutional as the provision failed to
satisfy the legal certainty requirement in limiting fundamental rights but the constitutionality of the
overall regulatory mechanism on public procession was confirmed. Leung was therefore still found
guilty but he was also partially successful in challenging the constitutionality of the Public Order
Ordinance. Both parties were satisfied with the CFA's decisions in this case.
256 Albert H.Y. Chen, "Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong," (2006) 15 Pacific Rim
Law and Policy Journal 627, at 680.
257 Yash Ghai, "The Legal Foundations of Hong Kong's Autonomy: Building on Sand," (2007) 29 The
Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 3.
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also vary. Some may not be too sensitive to any change and their response
may also be rather slow if compared with other associations. The susceptibil-
ity of each association to pressure from other players in the constitutional
game is not the same. Some can stand firm on their objectives against threats,
pressures or benefits while some may easily change their stance. All these
variables make civil society a very organic but unpredictable animal.
Associations in civil society may try their best to influence others so that
civil society may act as if it is a united entity against the other players in the
game along a favoured strategy. However, the other associations in the civil
society may put up counter strategies to compete for the leading strategy for
the whole civil society. This may end with the associations working for their
own strategies making it impossible to have a coherent strategy for civil so-
ciety as a whole. Even if they have such a united front, the people of Hong
Kong may not respond as directed.
The other players in the game may also try to exert influence over the
civil society; first through associations that are on more friendly terms, and
then move to extend their influence to other associations further away from
its relationship web. As the number of associations in civil society is so large,
influencing associations would not be done through direct contact, except for
a limited number of more influential associations. Mass media is the major
tool that could be utilised to influence civil society.
There is hardly any indicator to tell as to what extent the moulding effort
has achieved its purpose. It seems that there are no effective means to predict
how civil society will react.
From the weak response from civil society in the controversy over the
term of the Chief Executive and the third interpretation on the Basic Law by
the NPCSC, it seems that the new strategy of the Beijing Government has
achieved its objective to a certain degree. The small number of people par-
ticipating in the rallies on the first of July in 2005, 2006 and 2007 confirmed
this observation. The civil society is still more pragmatic than idealistic, more
economic than political, and more cooperative than confrontational. Unless
the HKSAR Government or the Beijing Government does something that
will frustrate the civil society continuously, immediately and overtly, the par-
ticipation of the civil society in the constitutional game will still be limited.
(i) An End for the Constitutional game of Hong Kong?
The Basic Law provides that the capitalist system and way of life in Hong
Kong will remain unchanged for 50 years. 5 1 It is unusual for a constitution to
provide its own end expressly and it is arguable that this provision means
only that the systems in Hong Kong will not be changed within 50 years.
258 Basic Law, Art 5.
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 576 2007
The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong 577
What will happen after 50 years is not provided and it is legally possible for
the constitutional game of Hong Kong to continue to operate under the
Basic Law after 2047.259
All the players do not want to see the constitutional game of Hong Kong
end before 2047 - at least. The Beijing Government continues to voice its
concerns that some people in Hong Kong still dream of independence for
Hong Kong and considers this is a threat to "One Country Two Systems." Its
insistence for the HKSAR to fulfil its constitutional duty to enact legislation
to implement Article 23 and its reluctance to allow Hong Kong people
to directly elect their Chief Executive and LegCo may arise from such a
concern.
However, at the same time, demands in Hong Kong for further demo-
cratic development may also be out of a fear that the guarantee provided by
the Basic Law on Hong Kong's autonomy can be arbitrarily and unilaterally
terminated by the Beijing Government. By having a democratically elected
Chief Executive and LegCo, some people in Hong Kong hope that these may
be institutional checks against the Beijing Government so as to prolong Hong
Kong's constitutional game.
Both fears may be unnecessary, as from the performances of all the players
in the last 10 years the Basic Law is still respected by all players as a binding
legal instrument making the game in Hong Kong still a constitutional game.
Unless there is substantial change to the attitudes of the players, the game
will remain as constitutional. One can expect the constitutional game will
not end earlier than 2047 and one can reasonably hope that the constitu-
tional game will continue beyond 2047.
5. Conclusion
One may be disappointed after reading this article that it is but only a brief
summary of the many activities in Hong Kong's constitutional game in the
last 10 years. This analysis may seem disorganised, as it is not structured
according to major court decisions or legal principles that one may find in
typical legal analysis. For those who have an interest in legal history, they
may expect that the analysis will follow a chronological order. This is not a
typical legal analysis; if it were to look too much like a typical legal analysis,
it would not have achieved its purpose. Political scientists may also find that
this is not an article applying typical methodologies and skills in political
science.
259 It has been reported that Deng Xiao-ping had once said that the Basic Law could be extended for
another 50 years.
Vol 37 Part 2
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 577 2007
578 Benny Y.T. Tai
The reality may be fragmented and our analytical framework is often
applied to force out a coherent picture of the reality which may not actually
be "real". The analysis presented in this article may look fragmented because
the traditional approaches under the legal and political paradigms of constitu-
tion are not used, but instead a more integrated paradigm. The reality that sees
through this analytical framework may be a distorted picture of the reality
but it may still have its value if it can expose some phenomena that other
analyt-ical frameworks have failed to reveal.
Therefore, if this article has shed new light on traditional doctrines such
that lawyers and political scientists can re-examine their doctrinal biases
through the lens of the other, its objective has been achieved.
It is also hoped that readers may apply this game analytical framework to
assist them in looking into the future either for game planning or just for
forecasting what may happen in the playing fields of Hong Kong's constitu-
tional game. However, one should never take the analytical framework
provided by a constitutional game as a kind of crystal ball.
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 578 2007
